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The Solange-Method as a Tool for
Regulating Competing Jurisdictions
Among International Courts and
Tribunals
NIKOLAos LAVRANOS

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the proliferation or multiplication of
international courts and tribunals, competition between these
courts, and the possible fragmentation of international law as a
result of the lack of a hierarchical structure, has received
increasing attention from a vast array of scholars and
practitioners.! It was therefore, appropriate that a conference on
this topic entitled, "International Courts and Tribunals in the 21s't
Century: The Future of International Justice" be organized to
reflect on the current situation and how to move forward.2
This article outlines two issues that were raised in the first
panel of the conference for which this author was invited to
. J.D., LL.M., Senior Researcher, Faculty of Law, ACIL, University of Amsterdam; Max
Weber Fellow at the EUI, Florence, as of September 1, 2008. This article has been written
as part of my NWO-sponsored research project, "Competing Jurisdiction Between the
ECJ and Other International Courts and Tribunals" (2005-2009). I am indebted to Nicolas
Vielliard for his assistance. The author can be contacted at nlavranos@yahoo.com.
1. See YUVAL SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2007) [hereinafter SHANY, REGULATING
JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS]; YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003) [hereinafter SHANY, COMPETING
JURISIDICTIONS]; Nikolaos Lavranos, The MOX Plant and ljzeren Rijn Disputes: Which
Court is the Supreme Arbiter?, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 223, 223-46 (2006) [hereinafter

Lavranos, The MOX Plant].
2. A conference organized by the Project on International Courts and Tribunals
(PICT) in cooperation with the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Grotius Centre
for International Legal Studies, held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, Nov. 30 - Dec. 1,
2007 [hereinafter PICT Conference at The Hague].
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comment upon. The first, more preliminary, question was whether
signs of the fragmentation of international law could be detected
as a result of the multiplication of international courts and
tribunals. The second question was whether there is a need for
further general or specific rules to regulate overlapping
jurisdiction among those courts. More specifically, the question
was put as to whether in this context, comity would be an
appropriate general approach to handle competing jurisdiction.
The analysis below follows the order of these questions.
Accordingly, Part II presents several case-studies which illustrate
the various effects of overlapping jurisdictions. Part III discusses
possible solutions to avoid the negative effects associated with
divergent or conflicting rulings by different courts and tribunals on
the same legal issue. The focus will be on comity, specifically, on
the more forceful variation of it, namely, the so-called Solangemethod (Solange means "as long as" in German)3 developed by
the German Federal Constitutional Court.
II.

CASE-STUDIES ON THE EFFECTS OF THE MULTIPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

In this part, several case-studies will be presented to illustrate
the effects that a multiplication of international courts and
tribunals can have when they come to divergent or conflicting
rulings or simply negate the existing jurisdiction of another court
or tribunal. The multiplication of international courts and tribunals
is not problematic on its own. On the contrary, it signals
preparation on the part of states to use courts and tribunals for
settling their disputes more often, rather than using armed forces.
In other words, the multiplication of international courts and
tribunals indicates a movement towards a rule of law based dispute
settlement between states.! Such multiplication, however, may
raise problems when courts arrive at divergent or even conflicting
rulings-as has been the case on several occasions. The primary
sources of these problems stem from the lack of a hierarchical,
legally binding relationship, between all the courts and tribunals.
3. Nikolaos Lavranos, Das .So-Lange-Prinzipim Verhiltnis von EGMR und EuGH,
41 EUROPARECHT 79, 79-92 (2006) [hereinafter Lavranos, Das So-Lange Prinzip].
4. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Judicial Governance of International
Trade Requires a Common Conception of Rule of Law and Justice, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L.
529, 529 (2007) [hereinafter Petersmann, Multilevel Judicial Governance of International
Trade].
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The lack of a singular hierarchy means that the various courts and
tribunals are not bound by each other's jurisprudence, permitting
them to act, formally and legally speaking, in "clinical isolation."'
The case-studies below cover a wide range of international
law, from environmental law, trade law, and human rights law, to
general international law issues such as individual and state
responsibility. Moreover, jurisdictional overlap also takes place
between different legal orders, for example, the European
Community (EC), the North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), its South-American counterpart, Mercado Comun del
Sur (MERCOSUR), vis-A-vis international trade law, as well as
EC law vis-A-vis European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
law.
This underlines the fact that the problem of competing
jurisdictions is not confined to a certain area of international law
but rather is of general importance requiring a similarly general
solution. The case-studies are each introduced by a short summary
of the facts, followed by a synopsis of the relevant points of the
decision, as far as they concern jurisdictional aspects, and
concluded with a short analysis.
The first case concerns the MOX Plant dispute which
involved three separate dispute settlement proceedings: (i) the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) arbitral tribunal's decision,6 (ii) the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
arbitral tribunal's decision, and (iii) the European Court of
Justice's (ECJ) judgment For the purposes of this article, the
relevant question in these proceedings asks whether the ECJ has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case, thereby precluding the
involvement of the other tribunals.
That question was also the focus in the second case regarding
the HIzeren Rijn (or Iron Rhine) dispute and the IJzeren Rijn
arbitral tribunal's award
5. The term "clinical isolation" is used by analogy in reference to Gabrielle
Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law-Praisesfor the ProhibitionAgainst
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD TRADE L. 87, 115-52 (1999).
6. OSPAR Final Award (Ir. v. U.K.) (OSPAR Arb. Trib. July 2, 2003), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org.
7. MOX Plant (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), 126 I.L.R. 334 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001).
8. Case C-459/03, Comm'n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4635.
9. See Permanent Court of Arbitration, PCA Awards Series, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id=1056 (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
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The third case deals with the Mexico Soft Drinks'" case
brought before the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its
relationship with the NAFTA dispute settlement system.
The fourth case examines the Brazilian Tyres" case brought
before the WTO and its relationship with the dispute settlement
system of the MERCOSUR.
The fifth case concerns the International Court of Justice's
(ICJ) recent Genocide Convention'2 ruling in which the ICJ
discussed the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) regarding the application of a
broader Nicaraguatest by the ICTY.
Finally, the last case turns to the European Court of Human
Rights' (ECtHR) Bosphorus judgment" in which the ECtHR
clarified its jurisdiction vis-A-vis the ECJ concerning the level of
fundamental rights protection in Europe.
A. The MOX Plant Dispute
1. The Facts
For many years, Ireland has been concerned with the
radioactive discharges of the MOX plant situated in Sellafield,
UK, that are being released into the Irish Sea.'4 After having tried,
unsuccessfully, to obtain information from the United Kingdom
about the discharges of the MOX plant, Ireland instituted
proceedings against the United Kingdom by raising two different
claims. 5
10. Panel Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,

WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Tax Measures Panel Report].
11. Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil Appellate
Body Report].
12. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26).
13. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1.
14. See generally Peter Brazel, Dep't of Env't, Heritage and Local Gov't, Ir., My
Neighbor Doesn't Like Nuclear: Relations Between "Nuclear" & "Non Nuclear"

Countries,

Presentation

at

PIME

Conference

(Feb.

14,

2006),

http://www.ecolo.org/documents/documents -in-english/Ireland-PETER-BRAZEL.doc

[hereinafter Presentation by Peter Brazel].
15. For dispute materials see Permanent Court of Arbitration, http://www.pcacpa.org. See also, Yuval Shany, The First MOX Plant Award: The Need to Harmonize
Competing Environmental Regimes and Dispute Settlement Procedures,17 LEIDEN J. OF
INT'L LAW 815,815-828 (2004) [hereinafter Shang,, The First MOX PlantAward].

2008]

The Solange-Method

279

First, Ireland wanted to obtain from the United Kingdom all
available information regarding the radioactive discharges of the
MOX plant by relying on Article 9 of OSPAR.'6 Article 9(2)
requires the contracting parties to make available information "on
the state of the maritime area, on activities or measures adversely
affecting or likely to affect it."' 7 Second, Ireland believed that the
discharge of the MOX plant contaminated its waters and,
therefore, constituted a violation of UNCLOS. Accordingly,
Ireland sought an award for the disclosure of information
regarding the MOX plant from the United Kingdom on the basis
of the OSPAR convention as well as a declaration that the United
Kingdom violated its obligations under UNCLOS.'8 After lengthy
negotiations, Ireland and the United Kingdom agreed to establish
arbitral tribunals under both the OSPAR and UNCLOS
conventions in order to resolve the dispute.'9
The dispute between the two EC member states also involved
EC law, specifically EC legislation and the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) treaty. Article 292 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty),
requires all disputes between EC member states involving EC law
to be brought exclusively before the ECJ.° Thus, this dispute
raised the potential overlap of jurisdiction between the two
arbitral tribunals and the ECJ."' Eventually, as discussed below,
the MOX Plant dispute came before the ECJ -at least with regard
to the UNCLOS dispute.
2. The OSPAR Arbitral Tribunal Award
In its decision on July 2, 2003, the OSPAR arbitral tribunal
asserted its jurisdiction over the case and rendered a final award.22
The tribunal held that the United Kingdom did not violate the
OSPAR Convention by not disclosing the information sought by

16. See Shany, The First MOX PlantAward, supra note 15.

17. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic art. 9(2), Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention].
18. See Shany, The First MOX PlantAward, supra note 15, at 818.
19. Id. at 816.
20.

PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW 203 (4th ed. 2008).

21. For a detailed analysis see Lavranos, The MOX Plant,supra note 1, at 213-41.
22. OSPAR Award, supra note 6. See also, Ted L. McDorman, Access to Information
Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. United Kingdom), 98 AM. J.INT'L L.
330, 330-41 (2004).
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Ireland." With respect to the possible implications of EC law to its
decision and in particular, the possible jurisdiction of the ECJ,the
tribunal refused to take into account any other sources of
international law or European law that might potentially be
applicable.24 Whereas Article 32(5)(a) of OSPAR states that the
arbitral tribunal shall decide according to the "rules of
international law, and, in particular, those of the OSPAR
Convention," the tribunal asserted that the OSPAR Convention
was to be considered a "self-contained" dispute settlement regime,
such that the tribunal could base its decision on the convention
alone. 5
3. Analysis
Despite the fact that a multitude of other relevant sources of
international law or European law were applicable in this case,
such as EC Directive 90/313,6 replaced by EC Directive 2003/4;27
ECJ jurisprudence;" and the Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access
to Justice
Regarding
Environmental
Matter
(Aarhus
Convention), 9 the OSPAR arbitral tribunal did not consider itself
competent to take these into account.30
More specifically, the OSPAR arbitral tribunal chose to
interpret the relevant provision of the OSPAR Convention much
more restrictively than the ECJ's interpretation of comparable EC
law provisions. While the tribunal was not legally bound to follow
the ECJ's jurisprudence, the similar context of the relevant
OSPAR and EC law provisions, and the fact that the dispute was
between two EC member states would have been sufficient
reasons for the OSPAR arbitral tribunal to give judicial deference
to the ECJ. By failing to do so, the tribunal created a fragmenting
23. OSPAR Final Award, supra note 6, 78.
24. Id.
85-86.
25. Id. $ 143. See generally OSPAR Convention, supranote 17.
26. Council Directive 90/313, art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56 (EC).
27. Council Directive 90/313, art. 11, 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26 (EC).
28. See Case C-186/04, Housieaux v. D6lgu6s du Conseil de laRgion de BruxellesCapitale, 2005 E.C.R. 1-3299. See also Case C-233/00, Comm'n v. France, 2003 E.C.R. I6625; Case C-316/01, Glawischnig, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5995; Case C-217/97, Comm'n v.
Germany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5087; Case C-321/96, Mecklenburg v. Kreis Pinneberg, 1998
E.C.R. 1-3809.
29. Council Decision 2005/370, 2005 O.J. (L 124) 1 (EC). The convention has been
ratified by all EC member states and recently also by the EC itself.
30. OSPAR Final Award, supranote 6, $J 100-104.
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discrepancy between EC law and the OSPAR Convention as to
the standard of access to information on environmental issues.
4. The UNCLOS Arbitral Award
In contrast to the straight-forward OSPAR proceeding
discussed above, the UNCLOS proceeding appears to be more
complicated because of the various dispute settlement options
offered by UNCLOS.
Specifically, Articles 287 and 288 of UNCLOS provide that
various forums can be selected by the contracting parties to settle
their disputes; parties may use the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the ICJ or ad hoc arbitral tribunals."
Moreover, Article 282 explicitly recognizes the possibility of
bringing a dispute before settlement bodies established by regional
or bilateral agreements. Because the parties had not agreed to
designate a particular dispute settlement forum, the dispute was
submitted to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII Article
287(5) of UNCLOS.3 Pending the establishment of this ad hoc
arbitral tribunal, however, Ireland requested from ITLOS interim
measures under Article 290(5) of UNCLOS.' Ireland asked that
the United Kingdom be ordered to suspend the authorization of
the MOX plant or at least take the measures necessary to halt the
3
operation of the MOX plant instantly."
Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, the ITLOS determined
that the conditions of Article 290(5) of UNCLOS were prima facie
met so that under Annex VII the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction
to decide on the merits of the case."6 Furthermore, the ITLOS
ordered both parties to cooperate and enter into consultations
regarding the operation of the MOX plant and its emissions into
the Irish Sea, pending the decision on the merits of the arbitral
award."

31. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 287-288, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982,1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
32. Id. at art. 282.
33. MOX Plant (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), supra note 7.
34. Id. 33.
35. Id. 27.
36. Id. 62. Note also, that even if the condition of Art. 290(5) were not prima facie
found, the tribunal deemed that provisional measures may still be prescribed in emergency
situations. Id. 64.
37. Id.
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The UNCLOS arbitral tribunal subsequently confirmed the
finding of ITLOS that it did in fact have prima facie jurisdiction.38
In a second step, however, the arbitral tribunal considered it
necessary to determine whether it had definite jurisdiction to solve
the dispute in view of the United Kingdom's objection that the
ECJ had jurisdiction under Article 282 of the EC Treaty since EC
law was also at issue. 9 The arbitral tribunal accepted the United
Kingdom's objection and consequently stayed proceedings. ' °
Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal urged the parties to first
determine whether or not the ECJ had jurisdiction before it would
proceed with rendering a decision on the merits.
The parties did not, however, have to take any action as the
European Commission, supported by the United Kingdom,
immediately began an Article 226 EC Treaty infringement
procedure against Ireland for violating Article 292 of the EC
Treaty and the identical provision in the EURATOM Treaty.42
The Commission argued that Ireland had instituted the
proceedings against the United Kingdom without taking into
account the fact that the European Community was a party to
UNCLOS. In particular, the Commission claimed that by
submitting the dispute to a tribunal outside the EC legal order,
Ireland had violated the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ as
enshrined in Article 292 of the EC Treaty and the similarly worded
Article 193 of EURATOM.43 Furthermore, according to the
Commission, Ireland had also violated the duty of loyal
cooperation incumbent upon it under Article 10 of the EC Treaty
and the similarly worded Article 192 of EURATOM."
Thus, the MOX Plant case ultimately came before the ECJ; at
least in as far as it concerned the UNCLOS proceedings, against
the initial intentions of the member states involved in the dispute.
5. Judgment of the ECJ
The Court first analyzed whether or not the dispute fell within
the acting competence of the EC,because Article 292 EC would

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

MOX Plant (No. 3) (Ir. v. U.K.), 126 I.L.R. 310 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2003).
Id. IT 15-16.
Id. 1 29.
Id. [30,69.
Comm'n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4635, 1.
Id. [59.
Id.
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be triggered only if the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the ECJ.45 The EC and its member states have concluded the Law
of the Sea Convention as a mixed agreement.46 In this context the
ECJ reaffirmed that mixed agreements have the same status in the
Community's legal order as agreements concluded by the EC
alone. 7 Consequently, when the EC ratified UNCLOS, the treaty
became an integral part of the Community legal order. Based on
UNCLOS the ECJ examined whether the EC had exercised its
competence in the policy area (maritime pollution) that is at the
center of the dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom.'
The ECJ concluded that the matters covered by the provisions of
UNCLOS relied upon by Ireland before the arbitral tribunal were
"very largely" regulated by Community law. 9 Ireland was thus
relying on provisions that had become part of the Community
legal order."0 This triggered the ECJ's jurisdiction under Article
292 EC."
The next issue was to determine whether that jurisdiction was
indeed exclusive in view of the fact that UNCLOS provides for its
own sophisticated dispute settlement system. Referring to its
position in Opinion 1/91," 2 the ECJ held,
[A]n international agreement cannot affect the allocation
of responsibilities defined in the Treaties and,
consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal
system, compliance with which the Court ensures under
Article 220 EC. That exclusive jurisdiction of the Court is
confirmed by Article 292 EC ....

An international agreement such as UNCLOS cannot affect
the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction regarding the resolution of
disputes between member states concerning the interpretation and
application of Community law."4 Hence, Ireland was precluded on
the basis of Articles 292 and 220 EC from bringing the dispute

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. 86.
Council Decision 98/392, 1998 O.J. (L 179) 1 (EC).
Comm'n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4635, T 84.
Id. 96.
Id. 110.
Id. 126.
Id. 127.
Case C-1/91, Comm'n v. EFTA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079.
Comm'n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4635, J 123.
Id. 132.
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before the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal. The Court of Justice went
as far as stating,
[T]he institution and pursuit of proceedings before the
arbitral tribunal... involve a manifest risk that the
jurisdictional order laid down in the Treaties and,
consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal
system may be adversely affected.
The ECJ did not simply claim exclusive jurisdiction in this
case, but found it necessary to make further remarks. First, only
the ECJ may determine whether, and to what extent, provisions of
the international agreement in question fall outside its jurisdiction,
and whether it may be adjudicated by another dispute settlement
body. 7 If member states doubt whether a dispute involves
Community law aspects, they are essentially obliged to obtain an
answer from the ECJ before bringing the case to another dispute
settlement body. Second, the ECJ found that Article 292 EC must
be understood as a specific expression of the member states' more
general duty of loyalty as enshrined in Article 10 EC. 8 Thus,
member states have a duty to inform and consult with the
competent Community institutions (i.e., the Commission and/or
the ECJ) prior to bringing a case before a dispute settlement body
other than the ECJ. 5' In this way, the Commission and the ECJ are
eventually informed of a dispute settlement procedure that may
interfere with Article 292 EC. This in turn puts the Commission in
a position to start an Article 226 EC infringement procedure
against a member state if it determines that Article 292 EC has
been violated. This is, however, entirely in the discretion of the
Commission. In contrast to the Commission, the ECJ has no
authority to seize ex officio by itself a case in order to protect its
exclusive jurisdiction.

55.

Id.

133.

56. Id. 1 154 (emphasis added).
57. Id. 9 135.
58. Id. 169 ("The obligation devolving on Member States, set out in Article 292 EC,
to have recourse to the Community judicial system and to respect the Court's exclusive
jurisdiction, which is a fundamental feature of that system, must be understood as a
specific expression of Member States' more general duty of loyalty resulting from Article
10 EC.").
59.

Id. T 179.
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6. Analysis
The MOX Plantdispute was the first case that highlighted the
potential problems associated with exclusive ECJ jurisdiction and
the multiplication of international courts and tribunals. The ECJ
decided to defend its exclusive jurisdiction to the fullest as far as it
concerned disputes between EC member states that potentially
involved EC law. It did so by substantially limiting the freedom of
EC member states to select a dispute settlement body of their
choice. Only if the ECJ establishes that no EC law issues are
involved, will EC member states be in a position to bring their
dispute before another dispute settlement body. This way, the ECJ
hopes to protect the uniform application of EC law in all EC
member states. The different approaches by the OSPAR and
UNCLOS arbitral tribunals, however, illustrate that the ECJ
cannot force a party to take EC law or the ECJ's jurisdiction into
account. The UNCLOS arbitral tribunal showed comity by staying
the proceedings and requesting the parties to check first whether
the jurisdiction of the ECJ was triggered in this case. In contrast,
the OSPAR arbitral tribunal did not show any comity towards the
ECJ.
The MOX Plant dispute also revealed that the ECJ is quite
helpless when it comes to defending its exclusive jurisdiction; it
cannot prevent member states from going to another court. Only
the Commission can take action against such a move if it considers
it necessary and appropriate.
In sum, the MOX Plant dispute exhibits fragmenting effects
as far as the OSPAR Convention vis-A-vis EC access on
information law, while at the same time showing unifying effects
by preserving the uniform application of EC environmental law as
far as UNCLOS law is concerned.
B. The Ijzeren Rijn Dispute
1. The Facts
The Ijzeren Rijn (also known as Iron Rhine) case concerned a
dispute between the Netherlands and Belgium as to which of the
parties had to pay the costs for the revitalization of an old railway
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line. ' The Ijzeren Rijn railway line was one of the first
international railway lines in mainland Europe in the 19th century,
running from Antwerp through the Netherlands to the Rhine
basin-area in Germany.' Belgium had obtained a right of transit
through the Netherlands on the basis of two treaties dating back to
1839 (Treaty of Separation) and 1897 (Railway Convention).62
After 1991 the railway line was no longer used.63 In the meantime,
the Netherlands assigned an area (the Meinweg, close to the city of
Roermond) which the railway line crosses as a "special area of
conservation" according to the EC Habitats Directive.' In 1994
the Netherlands also identified the Meinweg as a special protected
area in accordance with the EC Birds Directive. 6' The Birds
Directive, however, was superseded by the Habitats Directive as
far as what is relevant in the present dispute.6 In addition, the
Meinweg area was identified as a national park and a "silent area"
under domestic legislation. 7
It is at this point that the relevancy of EC law in this dispute
became apparent. In particular, Article 6 of the Habitats
Directive,' imposed strict conditions for any activities in a "special
area of conservation" such as the Meinweg area.
Despite this designation of protected status for the Meinweg
area, Belgium expressed its intention to start using the railway line
again. As a result, discussions took place between Belgium and
the Netherlands regarding the revitalization of the railway line.0
The impact studies that were conducted in order to assess the
possibility of a revitalization determined that additional costs of
about five hundred million euros would be involved in order to
60. The details of the dispute can be found at the website of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, supra note 15. See also, Ivan van Bladel, The Iron Rhine Arbitration Case: On
the Right Legal Track? An Analysis of the Award and of its Relation to the Law of the
European Community, 18 HAGUE Y.B. OF INT'L L. 3, 3-22 (2005); THE HAGUE
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, THE IRON RHINE (IJZEREN RIJN) ARBITRATION
(BELGIUM-NETHERLANDS) AWARD OF 2005 153-193 (2007).

61. PCA Awards Series, supra note 9,
16, 42.
62. Id. Tj 31, 42.
63. Id. 19.
64. Id. 128. See also Council Directive 92/43 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7 (EC).
65. PCA Awards Series, supra note 9, T 128.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Council Directive 92/43, 1992 O.J. (L 206). For recent cases concerning Art. 6 of
the Habitats Directive, see Case C-388/05, Comm'n v. Italy, 2007 E.C.R. 1-0000.
69. PCA Awards Series, supra note 9, T 21-23.
70. Id.
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meet the applicable environmental standards.7 Since no agreement
was reached on who should pay for the costs, both states agreed to
solve the dispute by bringing it before an arbitral tribunal
established under the auspices of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA). In the compromise between the Netherlands
and Belgium, the arbitral tribunal was explicitly called upon to
settle the dispute on the basis of international law, including
necessary European law, while respecting the obligations of the
parties arising out of Article 292 EC.72 As previously mentioned,
Article 292 EC prescribes that all disputes between EC member
states involving EC law should be brought exclusively before the
ECJY
Where this dispute at first glance seemed to involve only
international law aspects, the parties themselves recognized that
European law, in particular, Article 6 of the EC Habitats
Directive, could potentially be relevant and thus requested the
arbitral tribunal to consider this issue as well.
2. The Arbitral Decision
The arbitral tribunal explained that with regard to "the limits
drawn to its jurisdiction by the reference to Article 292 of the EC
Treaty... it finds itself in a position analogous to that of a
domestic court within the EC."7' The arbitral tribunal continued by
saying that if the tribunal arrived at the conclusion that it could not
decide the case brought before it without engaging in the
interpretation of EC law which constitute neither actes clairs nor
actes clair~s (i.e., the so-called CILFIT-conditions), Article 292
EC would be triggered and the dispute would have to be submitted
to the ECJ." Thus, the arbitral tribunal examined whether or not
the CILFIT-conditions were met.
The CILFIT conditions concern the obligation of national
courts of the EC member states to refer preliminary questions to
the ECJ. 7 6 Under these conditions, the obligation of national courts
71. Id. See also Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Permanent
2.13.5.1 (Jan. 2004),
Court of Arbitration, Iron Rhine Case (Belg. v. Neth.)
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/NL%20Counter-Memorial.pdf.
72. PCA Awards Series, supra note 9, 28.
73.

74.
75.
76.
E.C.R.

CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 20, at 203.

PCA Awards Series, supra note 9, 103.
Id.
Case 283/81, CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982
3415; Case 224/01, Kobler v. Republik Osterreich, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10239. But see
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to refer preliminary questions to the ECJ is only waived if: (i) the
question is not relevant; (ii) it has already been answered by the
ECJ; or (iii) the answer is entirely clear so that there is no need for
the ECJ to give an answer.' The arbitral tribunal only examined
the first possibility, i.e., whether the application of Community law
was necessary for rendering its award in this dispute.7"
The arbitral tribunal set out the framework of its jurisdiction
by stating that "[f]rom the viewpoint of Article 292 of the EC
Treaty the question thus faced by the Tribunal is... [D]oes the
Tribunal have to engage in the interpretation of the Habitats
Directive in order to enable it to decide the issue of the
reactivation of the Iron Rhine railway and the costs involved?"79
The arbitral tribunal concluded:
[T]he Tribunal has examined whether it would arrive at
different conclusions on the application of Article XII to
the Meinweg tunnel project and its costs if the Habitats
Directive did not exist. The Tribunal answers this question
in the negative, as its decision would be the same on the
basis of Article XII and of Netherlands environmental
legislation alone. Hence the questions of EC law debated
by the Parties are not determinative, or conclusive for the
Tribunal; it is not necessary for the Tribunal to interpret
the Habitats Directive in order to render its Award.
Therefore,... the questions of EC law involved in the
case do not trigger any obligations under Article 292 of
the EC Treaty.
In substance, the Ijzeren Rijn arbitral tribunal concluded that
the Netherlands had to grant a right of transit to Belgium based on
the Treaties of 1839 and 1897, but split the financial burden of the
various parts of the reactivation project between both parties.

Opinion of AG Colomer, Case C-461/03, Gaston Schul Douane-Expediteur BV v.
Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10513 (the ECJ flatly
rejecting any relaxation of the CILFIT-conditions as suggested by A.G. Colomer).
77. See DAMIAN CHALMER ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 299-302 (2006); J.
STEINER ET AL., EU LAW 210-17 (9th ed. 2006); CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 20, at
467.
78. -See PCA Awards Series, supra note 9, 104.
79. Id. 1 121.
80. Id. J 137.
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3. Analysis
It is remarkable that the Ijzeren Rijn arbitral tribunal
considered itself able to render its award despite the fact that
Community law (Habitats Directive and Article 292 EC) was
clearly applicable in this dispute and thus needed to be interpreted
and applied. This would have triggered the exclusive jurisdiction of
the ECJ based on Article 292 EC.
As a consequence of the fact that the Ijzeren Rijn arbitral
tribunal exercised its jurisdiction, the Habitats Directive was not
applied in this case, however, it was clearly applicable. That, in
turn, affected the uniform application of Community law in all EC
member states. Due to the fact that the Ijzeren Rijn arbitral
tribunal was not in a position to request a preliminary ruling from
the ECJ because it did not meet the conditions of a proper court
within the meaning of Article 234 EC, 1 the arbitral tribunal was all
the more obliged to refuse its jurisdiction in this case and refer the
parties to the ECJ as the only proper forum. Consequently, the
Ijzeren Rijn arbitral tribunal caused fragmentation-not so much
within the international legal order-but rather within the
European legal order by adjudicating a case that was clearly an EC
law matter.
Finally, this case confirms the observation made above
regarding the MOX Plant dispute that arbitral tribunals are not

81. The ECJ formulated the conditions for a court or tribunal to be able to request a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ as follows:

12. In order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or
tribunal of a Member State for the purposes of Article 234 EC, the Court takes
account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law,
whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its
procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is
independent (see, in particular, Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I4961, paragraph 23, and the case-law there cited, and Case C-516/99 Schmid
[2002] ECR 1-4573, paragraph 34).

13. Under the Court's case-law, an arbitration tribunal is not a court or tribunal
of a Member State' within the meaning of Article 234 EC where the parties are
under no obligation, in law or in fact, to refer their disputes to arbitration and
the public authorities of the Member State concerned are not involved in the
decision to opt for arbitration nor required to intervene of their own accord in
the proceedings before the arbitrator (Case 102/81 Nordsee' Deutsche
Hochseefischerei [1982] ECR 1095, paragraphs 10 to 12, and Case C-126/97 Eco
Swiss [1999] ECR 1-3055, paragraph 34).

Case C-125/04, Denuit v. Transorient - Mosaique Voyages & Culture SA, 2005 E.C.R. I923,

12-13. It is submitted that this also applies in analogy to international arbitral

tribunals.

290

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 30:275

particularly concerned with the possibility that the exclusive
jurisdiction of the ECJ may be triggered in a certain case. Instead,
tribunals prefer to seize jurisdiction and decide the case even if it
requires presenting flawed legal arguments.
C. The Mexico Soft Drinks Dispute
1. The Facts
In 2004 the United States complained about certain tax
measures imposed by Mexico on soft drinks and other beverages
that use any sweetener other than cane sugar. 2 The tax measures
concerned included: (i) a 20% tax on soft drinks and other
beverages that use any sweetener other than cane sugar
("beverage tax"), which is not applied to beverages that use cane
sugar; and (ii) a 20% tax on the commissioning, mediation, agency,
representation, brokerage, consignment and distribution of soft
drinks and other beverages
that use any sweetener other than cane
83
sugar ("distribution tax")
The United States considered these taxes inconsistent with
Article III of GATT 1994, in particular, Article 111:2, first and
second sentences, and Article III:4.' Accordingly, the United
States requested consultations with Mexico, which were
unsuccessful.' Consequently, the United States instituted dispute
settlement proceedings against Mexico before the WTO.'
As a preliminary point, Mexico raised the issue of
jurisdictional competition. More specifically, Mexico requested the
WTO panel to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in favor of an
Arbitral Panel under Chapter Twenty of NAFTA.' In short,
Mexico argued that this dispute involved two NAFTA states and
touched on NAFTA provisions and, therefore, should be treated
as a NAFTA dispute rather than a WTO dispute.' Indeed, Mexico
claimed that it had adopted the measure in order to force the
United States to cooperate in finding a resolution to the dispute

82. Tax Measures Panel Report, supranote 10,
83. Id. 2.2.
84. Id. [1.2.
85. Id. 11.1.

86. Id. [1.4.
87. Id. 3.2.
88. Id. 7.11.

1.1.
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within the framework of NAFTA" Accordingly, Mexico argued
that a NAFTA panel would be in a better position to decide this
dispute.9" It should be noted that Mexico and the United States had
been engaged in a broader dispute on sugar for quite some time
that has been litigated in various proceedings before the WTO and
NAFTA. 9'
2. The WTO Panel Ruling
In a preliminary ruling, the WTO panel rejected Mexico's
request and found instead that under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) it had no discretion to decide whether or
not to exercise its jurisdiction in a case properly before it.92 The
WTO panel added that even if it had such discretion, it "did not
consider that there were facts on record that would justify the
panel declining to exercise its jurisdiction in the present case.""
In its reasoning, the WTO panel opined that "discretion may
be said to exist only if a legal body has the freedom to choose
among several options, all of them equally permissible in law."9
According to the panel, "such freedom.., would exist within the
framework of the DSU only if a complainant did not have a legal
right to have a panel decide a case properly before it."9 Referring
to Article 11 of the DSU and to the ruling of the Appellate Body
in Australia-Salmon, the panel observed that "the aim of the
WTO dispute settlement system is to resolve the matter at issue in
particular cases and to secure a positive solution to disputes" and
that a panel is required "to address the claims on which a finding is
necessary to enable the [Dispute Settlement Body] to make
sufficiently precise recommendations or rulings to the parties."9

89. Id. 8.89.
90. Id. 7.11.
91. For detailed discussions of the dispute see Alice Vacek-Aranda, Sugar Wars:
Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA and the WTO As Seen Through the Lens of the HFCS
Case and Its Effects on U.S.-Mexican Relations, 12 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL'Y 121, 121-60
(2006) and Patricia Larios, The Fight at the Soda Machine: Analyzing the Sweetener Trade
Dispute Between the United States and Mexico Before the World Trade Organization, 20
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 649, 649-702 (2005).
92. Tax Measures Panel Report, supra note 10, Annex B (fax from Chairman of the
Panel, dated Jan. 18, 2005).
93. Id. 7.18.
94. Id. 7.7.
95. Id.
96. Id. 7.8 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Australia-MeasuresAffecting
Importation of Salmon, 223, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998)).
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From this, the panel concluded that a WTO panel "would seem
therefore not to be in a position to choose freely whether or not to
exercise its jurisdiction."97 Referring to Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the
DSU, the panel further stated that "[i]f a WTO panel were to
decide not to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case, it would
diminish the rights of the complaining Member under the DSU
and other WTO covered agreements."98 The WTO panel added
that Article 23 of the DSU makes it clear that "a WTO Member
that considers that any of its WTO benefits have been nullified or
impaired as a result of a measure adopted by another Member has
the right to bring the case before the WTO dispute settlement
system.""
Finally, the WTO panel did not make any findings on
"whether there may be other cases where a [WTO] panel's
jurisdiction might be legally constrained, notwithstanding its
approved terms of reference."'" In any case, the WTO panel
explicitly rejected Mexico's contention that the WTO proceeding
was identical with the on-going negotiations to resolve the sugar
dispute within the NAFTA context.' °' Consequently, the WTO
panel concluded,
[E]ven conceding that there seems to be an unresolved
dispute between Mexico and the United States under the
NAFTA, the resolution of the present WTO case cannot
be linked to the NAFTA dispute. In turn, any findings
made by this Panel, as well as its conclusions and
recommendations in the present case, only relate to
Mexico's rights and obligations under the WTO covered
agreements, and not to its rights and obligations under

97. Id.
98. Id. 7.9.
99. Id.
100. Id. 7.10.
101. Id. $ 7.14. The Panel noted, in this regard, that:
In the present case, the complaining party is the United States and the'measures
in dispute are allegedly imposed by Mexico. In the NAFTA case, the situation
appears to be the reverse: the complaining party is Mexico and the measures in
dispute are allegedly imposed by the United States. As for the subject matter of
the claims, in the present case the United States is alleging discriminatory
treatment against its products resulting from internal taxes and other internal
measures imposed by Mexico. In the NAFTA case, instead, Mexico is arguing
that the United States is violating its market access commitments under the
NAFFA.
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other international agreements, such as the NAFTA, or
other rules of international law."°
3. The WTO Appellate Body Ruling
On appeal before the WTO Appellate Body, Mexico argued
that the panel erred in rejecting its request that it decline to
exercise jurisdiction in the circumstances of the present dispute."°3
Mexico submitted that WTO panels, like other international
bodies and tribunals, have certain implied jurisdictional powers
that derive from their nature as adjudicative bodies.'"
[S]uch powers include the power to refrain from
exercising substantive jurisdiction in circumstances where
the underlying or predominant elements of a dispute
derive from rules of international law under which claims
cannot be judicially enforced in the WTO, such as the
NAFTA provisions or when one of the disputing parties
refuses to take the matter to the 'appropriate forum'."
Mexico argued, in this regard, that the United States' claims under
Article III of the GATT 1994 are "inextricably linked to a broader
dispute" regarding access of Mexican sugar to the U.S. market
under NAFTA.' ° Mexico further emphasized that "there is
nothing in the DSU that, explicitly rules out the existence of a
WTO panel's power to decline to exercise" validly established
jurisdiction."7 Accordingly, Mexico argued that the WTO panel
should have exercised this power in the circumstances of this
dispute.' 0 In contrast, the United States argued that "the [WTO]
Panel's own terms of reference in this dispute instructed the panel
to examine the matter referred to the DSB by the United States
and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations and rulings provided for under the DSU."'

102. Id. 1 7.15.
103. Appellate Body Report, Mexico- Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, T 6, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Mexico Appellate Body
Report]. See generally Alberto Alvarez Jimenez, The WTO AB Report on Mexico-Soft
Drinks, and the Limits of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 33 LEGAL ISSUES ECON.
INTEGRATION 319, 319-33 (2006).

104. Mexico Appellate Body Report, supra note 103,
105. Id. (citation omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. 1 11.
108. Id.
109. Id. 22.

10.
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The WTO Appellate Body started its analysis by noting that
Mexico did not question whether the WTO panel had jurisdiction
to hear the U.S. claims."' Moreover, Mexico did not claim that
there were "legal obligations under the NAFTA or any other
international agreement to which Mexico and the United States
are both parties, which might raise legal impediments to the Panel
hearing this case."''. "Instead, Mexico's position [was] that,
although the [WTO] Panel had the authority to rule on the merits
of the United States' claims, it also had the 'implied power' to
abstain from ruling on them, and 'should have exercised this power
in the circumstances of this dispute.' '' 112 Hence, the issue before the
Appellate Body was not "whether the [WTO] Panel was legally
precluded from ruling on the United States' claims that were
before it, but, rather, whether the [WTO] Panel could decline, and
should have declined, to exercise jurisdiction with respect to the
United States' claims
under Article III of the GATT 1994 that
3'
it.""
before
were
The WTO Appellate Body continued by agreeing with
Mexico's claim that "WTO panels have certain powers that are
inherent in their adjudicative function."" According to the
Appellate Body, "WTO panels have the right to determine
whether they have jurisdiction in a given case, as well as to
determine the scope of their jurisdiction.""-'
In this regard, the [WTO] Appellate Body has previously
stated that it is a widely accepted rule that an
international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of
its own jurisdiction on its own initiative, and to satisfy
itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes before
it. Furthermore, the [WTO] Appellate Body has also
explained that [WTO] panels have a margin of discretion
to deal, always in accordance with due process, with
specific situations that may arise in a particular case and
that are not explicitly regulated. For example, [WTO]
panels may exercise judicial economy, that is, refrain

110. Id.

44.

111. Id. (citation omitted).
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.

45.
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from ruling on certain claims, when such rulings are not
necessary to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute."6
But at the same time, "the [WTO] Appellate Body has cautioned
of the matter at issue
that to provide only a partial resolution
7
would be false judicial economy.""

In the WTO Appellate Body's view, it does not necessarily
follow, however, from the existence of these inherent adjudicative
powers that, once jurisdiction has been validly established, WTO
panels would have the authority to decline to rule on the entirety of
the claims that are before them in a dispute."8 On the contrary, the
WTO Appellate Body noted that, while recognizing WTO panels'
inherent powers, it has previously emphasized that:
Although panels enjoy some discretion in establishing
their own working procedures, this discretion does not
extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the
DSU.... Nothing in the DSU gives a panel the authority
either to disregard or to modify.

..

explicit provisions of

the DSU."9
Indeed, the "fact that a [WTO] Member may initiate a WTO
dispute whenever it considers that any benefits accruing to that
Member are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member implies that that Member is entitled to a ruling by a WTO
panel."'' 0 According to the WTO Appellate Body, "[a] decision by
a [WTO] panel to decline to exercise validly established
jurisdiction would seem to 'diminish' the right of a complaining
Member to 'seek the redress of a Violation of obligations' within
the meaning of Article 23 of the DSU, and to bring a dispute
pursuant to Article 3.3 of the DSU. This would not be consistent
obligations under Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the
with a, 1 panel's
4
DSU.

116. Id. [45 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
117.

Id. (internal quote and citation omitted).

118. Id. 46 (emphasis added).
119. Id. (citing Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical
and Agricultural Chemical Products, 92, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997)) (emphasis in
original).
120. Id. 52 (internal citations omitted).
121. Id. 53 (citations omitted). See also Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art 3.2, 19.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments -Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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Finally, with regard to the issue of jurisdictional competition,
the WTO Appellate Body, like the WTO Panel, did not express a
view as to whether there may be other circumstances in which
legal impediments could exist that would preclude a panel from
ruling on the merits of the claims that are before it.'2 2 Thus, the
WTO Appellate
Body saw no reason to disagree with the Panel's
3
decision.1
4. Analysis
The Mexico Soft Drinks case appears to be the first case in
which the issue of jurisdictional competition between dispute
settlement systems established by regional trade agreements
(RTAs) and the global WTO dispute settlement system was
explicitly raised. The WTO Panel and Appellate Body, however,
were able to avoid dealing with this issue mainly on factual
grounds arguing that the dispute before the WTO was a different
one than that raised before NAFTA. Regardless of whether that
argument is true or not, the general approach of the WTO Panel
and Appellate Body shows little consideration for comity. The
WTO Appellate Body seems to argue that if a WTO panel has
jurisdiction in a case, it must exercise it by rendering a ruling,
regardless of whether or not other courts or tribunals might have
jurisdiction or have been seized by the dispute. Of course, a
different approach is imaginable in which a WTO panel or
Appellate Body relinquishes its jurisdiction and orders the parties
to resolve their dispute before another dispute settlement body, or
alternatively, the WTO panel or Appellate Body could stay the
proceedings until that other body renders its decision. In this way,
the WTO panel or Appellate Body could take that decision into
account when adjudicating the dispute.
In sum, both the WTO Panel as well as the WTO Appellate
Body carefully circumvented the issue by not expressing any clear
view on the topic of jurisdictional competition.

122. Mexico Appellate Body Report, supra note 103, T 54.
123. Id T 57.
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D. The Brazilian Tyres Case
1. The Facts

In 2000, Brazil adopted legislation in order to effectively
reduce the waste of tires because of the risk for the health and the
environment associated with the exposure to toxic emissions
caused by tire fires and the transmission of the dengue disease to
animals.' 2' This legislation (Portaria SECEX 8/2000) contained an
import ban on retreaded and used tires.' 25 Following the adoption
of Portaria SECEX 8/2000, Uruguay requested in August 2001 the
initiation of arbitral proceedings within MERCOSUR. 16 Uruguay
alleged that Portaria SECEX 8/2000 constituted a new restriction
of commerce between MERCOSUR countries, which was
incompatible with Brazil's obligations under MERCOSUR'
In its ruling on January 9, 2002, the arbitral tribunal found
that the Brazilian measure was incompatible with MERCOSUR
Decision CMC No. 22 of June 29, 2000, which obliges
MERCOSUR countries not to introduce new intra-zone
restrictions on commerce.1 8 Following the MERCOSUR arbitral
tribunal award, Brazil enacted Portaria SECEX No. 2 of March 8,
2002, which eliminated the import ban for remolded tires
originating in other MERCOSUR countries.' This exemption was
incorporated into Article 40 of Portaria SECEX 14/2004, which
contains three main elements: (i) an import ban on retreaded tires
(the "import ban"); (ii) an import ban on used tires; and (iii) an
exemption from the import ban of imports of certain retreaded

124. Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil Panel Report].

4.11,

125. Id. I 2.8(a).
126.

Id.

2.13.

127. See First Written Submission of the European Communities, Brazil-Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (WT/DS332),

70 (April 27, 2006), available at

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/july/tradoc_129251.07.06.pdf

[hereinafter First

Written Submission, Retreaded Tyres].
128. See Laudo Del Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc del Mercosur Constituido para

Entender de la Controversia Presentada por la Republica Oriental del Uruguay a la
Republica Federativa del Brasil sobre "Prohibicion de Importacion de Neumaticos
at
de
Uruguay,"
available
Procedentes
Remoldeados
(Remolded)

http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal %20intermediario/es/controversias/arquivos/VI %2/
LAUDO.pdf.
129. First Written Submission, Retreaded Tyres, supra note 127,

137.
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tires from other countries of the MERCOSUR,
which is referred
1 30
to as the "MERCOSUR exemption.
The "MERCOSUR exemption" did not form part of previous
regulations prohibiting the importation of retreaded tires, notably
Portaria SECEX 8/2000, but was introduced as a result of a ruling
issued by a MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal.'
The EC initiated proceedings against Brazil before the WTO
dispute settlement body complaining about the import ban and the
MERCOSUR exemption. 32 Essentially, the EC argued that the
"MERCOSUR exemption" is discriminatory and that Brazil was
not obliged to implement the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal
decision in the way it did, i.e., lifting the ban only for
MERCOSUR Member States.'33 According to the EC, Brazil
should instead have lifted the ban for all WTO Members.
Besides, the EC claimed that Brazil was at least partially
responsible for the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal's ruling that
resulted in the adoption of the "MERCOSUR exemption"
because it did not defend itself in the MERCOSUR proceedings
on grounds related to human health and safety. "'
Brazil defended its measure by emphasizing that it introduced
the exemption' only after the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal ruled
that the import ban violated Brazil's obligations under
36 In addition, Brazil
MERCOSUR.'
argued that the MERCOSUR
arbitral tribunal ruling was adopted in the context of an agreement
intended to liberalize trade that is expressly recognized in Article
XXIV of the GATT 1994.'M Moreover, Brazil argued that it had an
obligation under international law to implement the ruling of the
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal.'38 Indeed, Brazil claimed that it
applied the MERCOSUR ruling in the narrowest way possible,
that is, by exempting imports of a particular kind of retreaded tires
(remolded) from the application of the ban. 9

130. Brazil Panel Report, supra note 124, 2.7.
131. First Written Submission, Retreaded Tyres, supra note 127, $ 137.

132. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil-Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, VT/DS332/1 (June 20, 2005).

133. Brazil Panel Report, supra note 124,
134. Id.
135. Id. $ 7.268.
136. Id. T 4.302.

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.

3.3(c).
4.302.
7.279.

4.299.
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2. The WTO Panel Ruling
The WTO Panel accepted that it was only after the
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal found Brazil's ban on the
importation of remolded tires to constitute a new restriction on
trade prohibited under MERCOSUR that Brazil exempted
remolded tires originating from MERCOSUR countries from the
application of the import ban.' 0 For the WTO panel, the
MERCOSUR exemption "does not seem to be motivated by
capricious or unpredictable reasons [as it] was adopted further to a
ruling within the framework of MERCOSUR, which has binding
legal effects for Brazil, as a party to MERCOSUR.'". The WTO
Panel added that the discrimination arising from the MERCOSUR
exemption was not "a priori unreasonable,' '4 2 because this
discrimination arose in the context of an agreement of a type
expressly recognized under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 that
"inherently provides for preferential treatment in favour of its
members, thus leading
to discrimination between those members
1'
and other countries. 43
According to the WTO Panel, the MERCOSUR arbitral
tribunal ruling provided a reasonable basis to enact the
MERCOSUR exemption, with the implication that the resulting
discrimination is not arbitrary.'" The WTO Panel indicated,
however, that it was not suggesting that "the invocation of any
international agreement would be sufficient under any
circumstances, in order to justify the existence of discrimination in'
the application of a measure under the chapeau of Article XX.' "1
The WTO panel concluded that the "MERCOSUR exemption"
had not resulted in the import ban being applied in a manner
that
46
would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.'
Finally, the WTO Panel explicitly stated that it was not in a
position to assess in detail the choice of arguments by Brazil in the
140. Id. [ 7.272.
141. Id.
142. Id. 7.273.
143. Id.
144. Id. 7.281.
145. Id. 7.283. The Panel also considered that it was not contrary to the terms of
Article XXIV: 8(a) of the GATT 1994-which specifically excludes measures taken under
Article XX from the requirement to liberalize "substantially all the trade" within a
customs union-to take into account, as it did, "the fact that the MERCOSUR exemption
was adopted as a result of Brazil's obligations under MERCOSUR." Id. 7.284.
146. Id. $ 7.289.
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MERCOSUR proceedings or to second-guess the outcome of the
case in light of Brazil's litigation strategy in those proceedings.' 7
Indeed, the WTO Panel considered it inappropriate to engage in
such an exercise.' Moreover, the Panel underlined that while the
particular litigation strategy followed in that instance by Brazil
turned out to be unsuccessful, it is not clear that a different
strategy would necessarily have led to a different outcome.' 9
Hence, the WTO Panel sided on these points with the position of
Brazil.
3. The WTO Appellate Body Ruling
The EC appealed the Panel's ruling to the WTO Appellate
Body.' The WTO Appellate Body's started by pointing out that
even though the discrimination between MERCOSUR countries
and other WTO Members in the application of the import ban was
introduced as a consequence of a ruling by a MERCOSUR
arbitral tribunal, that ruling is not an acceptable rationale for the
discrimination. That ruling is not an acceptable rationale because
it bears no relationship to the legitimate objective pursued by the
import ban that falls within the purview of Article XX(b).'52
Accordingly, the WTO Appellate Body found that the
"MERCOSUR exemption" had resulted in the import ban being
applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination. 3
The WTO Appellate Body also stated that, like the WTO
Panel, it does not consider Brazil's decision to comply with the
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal ruling as "capricious" or
"random.'. 5 Indeed, according to the WTO Appellate Body,
"[a]cts implementing a decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial
body-such as the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal-can hardly be
' ''
characterized as an act that is 'capricious'

or 'random.

5

According to the WTO Appellate Body, however, discrimination
can result from a rational decision or behavior and still be
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. 7.276.
Id.
Id.
Brazil Appellate Body Report, supra note 11.
Id. at 90, 228.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91, 232.
Id.
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"arbitrary or unjustifiable" if it is explained by a rationale that
bears no relationship or opposes any objectives of Article XX of
GATT. 56 Thus,

the

Appellate

Body

concluded

that

the

"MERCOSUR exemption" had resulted in the import ban being
applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination. 157
The WTO Appellate Body then turned to Brazil's defense
strategy before the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal. It noted that
Brazil could have sought to justify the challenged import ban on
the grounds of human, animal, and plant health under Article
50(d) of the Treaty of Montevideo. 8 Brazil, however, decided not
to do so. The WTO Appellate Body again explicitly stated, like the
WTO Panel, that it would not be appropriate for it to second-guess
Brazil's decision not to invoke Article 50(d).' '9 At the same time,
however, the WTO Appellate Body inferred from this that Article
50(d) of the Treaty of Montevideo, and the discrimination
associated with the "MERCOSUR exemption" does not
necessarily result from a conflict between provisions under
MERCOSUR and the GATT 1994.'6° In sum, the WTO Appellate
Body reversed the findings of the WTO Panel on this point.
4. Analysis
The Brazilian Tyre case can be considered an evolution from
the Mexican Soft Drinks case since the WTO Panel and Appellate
Body could not circumvent the fact that the basis of this dispute
was the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal's ruling. This dispute is
particularly interesting because it shows the opposite approach
adopted by the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body regarding the
weight that should given to the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal's
ruling.
The WTO Panel accepted Brazil's defense that the measure
was adopted in order to implement the MERCOSUR arbitral
tribunal's ruling (i.e., to fulfill its international obligations). Since
156. Id. at 91-92, 232.
157. Id. at 92, 233.
158. Id. at 92, T 234. See also 1980 Montevideo Treaty Establishing the Latin American
Integration Association (ALADI) art. 50(d), Aug. 12, 1980 [hereinafter 1980 Montevideo
Treaty] ("No provision under the present Treaty shall be interpreted as precluding the
adoption and observance of measures regarding ... [p]rotection of human, animal and
plant life and health.").
159. Brazil Appellate Body Report, supra note 11.
160. Id. at 92, 234.
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MERCOSUR is a Free Trade Area/Customs Union within the
meaning of Article XXIV GATT, a measure that benefits
MERCOSUR members naturally discriminates against nonmembers. Not only is this the whole purpose of a Free Trade Area
and Custom Union, it is also acceptable under Article XXIV
GATT. 6' Consequently, the WTO Panel did not review or criticize

the ruling of the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal, but rather
accepted it as a fact and a starting point of the whole dispute. In
addition, the WTO Panel quite rightly refrained from assessing
Brazil's defense strategy before the MERCOSUR arbitral
tribunal. The defense strategy of a WTO member before another
dispute settlement body that is not bound by WTO law is entirely
its own business. Any assessment of it by a WTO Panel would go
far beyond the Panel's competence.
The WTO Appellate Body clearly did not feel any such
constraints. While the WTO Appellate Body claimed to have
steered clear from reviewing the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal's
decision, it nevertheless rejected the logic of the WTO Panel as
argued by Brazil. Thus, it rejected the argument that being obliged
to implement a ruling from a judicial or quasi-judicial body is an a
priori presumption of WTO law compatibility. Accordingly, the
Appellate Body seems to suggest that even though Brazil was
clearly obliged by the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal to bring its
measure in line with MERCOSUR obligations, Brazil was at the
same time required to do so in a way that is compatible with its
WTO obligations. Therefore, the WTO Appellate Body attached a
sense of supremacy to WTO law over other international (regional
trade) agreements and decisions rendered by dispute settlement
bodies that have been established by such treaties. In other words,
it seems that in this decision the WTO Appellate Body suggested
that other dispute settlement bodies should issue their decisions in
conformity with WTO law and Appellate Body jurisprudence; or
at least make sure that the implementation of their decisions does
not violate any WTO laws.
Even more interesting, however, is the fact that the WTO
Appellate Body discussed Brazil's defense strategy before the
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal. Although the WTO Appellate

161. See generally JAMES MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE
GATr/WTO: ARTICLE XXIV AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE REQUIREMENT (Asser
Press 2002).
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Body stressed that it is inappropriate to second-guess Brazil's
decision not to invoke Article 50 of the Montevideo Treaty, the
WTO Appellate Body at the same time "punished" Brazil's choice
by excluding the possibility that there might have been a conflict
between MERCOSUR and GATT provisions or between the
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal's decision and the Appellate
Body's ruling concerning the same dispute."
As argued above, the assessment of Brazil's defense strategy
by the WTO Appellate Body is an unprecedented interference of
Brazil's sovereignty in defending its interests before other dispute
settlement bodies that are fully independent and free from any
"supervision" by the WTO Appellate Body. In other words, the
WTO Appellate Body has no competence to assess the defense
strategy used by a WTO member before other dispute settlement
bodies and, therefore, is prevented from drawing conclusions from
it to the detriment of that WTO member relating to the dispute at
hand.
In sum, the different approaches between the WTO Panel and
the Appellate Body on this point unveils the underlying potential
problems of competing jurisdictions between dispute settlement
systems created by regional trade agreements (like NAFTA and
MERCOSUR) and the global WTO dispute settlement system.6 '
In view of the increasing number of dispute settlement systems
being established and enhanced at the regional level,'6' it is
doubtful whether a claim of WTO Appellate Body supremacy over

162. See Brazil Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, at 92,

234.

163. See Rafael Leal-Arcas, Choice of Jurisdiction in International Trade Disputes:
Going Regional or Global?, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-59 (2007); L. BARTELS, REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 447-575 (Bartels & Ortino eds.,
2006).

164. See generally Daniel J. Pav6n Piscitello & Jan Peter Schmidt, In the Footsteps of
the ECJ: First Decision of the Permanent Mercosur-Tribunal, 34 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON.

INTEGRATION 283, 283-93 (2007); Arthur E. Appleton & Bernd U. Graf, Freedom of
Speech and Assembly Versus Trade and Transit Rights: Roadblocks to EU and Mercosur
Integration, 34 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 255, 255-81 (2007); Joost Pauwelyn,

Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdictions, 13 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 231, 231-304 (2004) [hereinafter Pauwleyn, Going Global, Regional, or

Both?]; Amala Nath, Comment, The Safta Dispute Settlement Mechanism: An Attempt to
Resolve or Merely Perpetuate Conflict in the South Asian Region?, 22 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 333, 333-58 (2007); David A. Gantz, Settlement of Dispute Under the Central
America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 331, 331-410 (2007).

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 30:275

other dispute settlement bodies is the most cooperative answer to
this problem.
E. The ICJ's Genocide Ruling
1. The Facts
The war and killings in the Balkans were so widespread that a
special court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), was established by the United Nations to
prosecute individuals responsible for those acts.'65 Accordingly, the
ICTY has rendered numerous judgments in which it has punished
individuals responsible for the horrendous crimes that were
committed during the 1990s, such as ethnic cleansing and mass
rapes.
In one of the most discussed cases, Tadic,'67 the ICTY was not
concerned with a question of state responsibility, but with the
nature of armed conflicts. In order to ascertain whether the
conflict was international, however, the ICTY Chamber needed to
look into the rules on state responsibility. 169 The ICTY Chamber
identified two degrees of control, the ICJ's Nicaragua "effective
control" test 7 ' and the previously established "overall control"
test.' The ICTY Chamber noted that the former is more
applicable to private individuals engaged by a state to perform
specific illegal acts in the territory of another state and the latter is
more applicable to organized and hierarchically structured
groups. 2 The ICTY Appeals . Chamber took the view that acts
committed by Bosnian Serbs could give rise to international
responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY-as it
then was) on the basis of the overall control exercised by the FRY
over the Republika Srpska and the VRS (army of the Republika
Srpska)" 3 Their view remained without there being any need to
165. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ITCY).
166. See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY],
http://www.icty.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
167. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Appeals Judgment, 34-75 (July 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Tadic Appeals Judgment].
168. See id. at 34, 1 84-85.
169. Id. at 42, 1 105.
170. Id. at 40,
99-100.
171. Id. at 56, 1 131.
172. Id. at 50, [ 124-25.
173. Id. at 69, 156.
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prove that each operation was carried out on the FRY's
instructions, or under its effective control.
Accordingly, in its Tadic judgment, the ICTY expressly
adopted a conflicting view on the issue of use of force in customary
international law.'74 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY argued
that the law as stated by the ICJ on the use of force was not
"persuasive" and was "unconvincing." From there, it went on to
declare that the law was contrary to the ICJ's ruling.'75 In a
subsequent case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber further declared
that this contrary statement of the law had to be followed
notwithstanding
its asserted differences with the point of view of
71 6
the ICJ.
It could be argued that the test of "overall control" is flexible,
d " case where the ICTY Appeals Chamber held
as in the Celebici'
that "[t]he 'overall control' test could thus be fulfilled even if the
armed forces acting on behalf of the 'controlling State' had
autonomous choices of means and tactics although participating in
a common strategy along with the controlling State.'. 8
In separate proceedings before the ICJ, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
relying in particular on the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, argued that Serbia
shared with the Republika Srpska the vision of a "Greater
Serbia."'79 Consequently, they argued that Serbia gave its support
to those persons and groups responsible for the crimes, which
allegedly constitute genocide." Bosnia-Herzegovina submitted
that Serbia armed and equipped those persons and groups
throughout the war and, therefore, should be held responsible.'

174. See MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, Consistency in Holdings of International
Tribunals, in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODC 633, 633-50 (Nisuke Ando et al.

eds., 2002).
175. Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 167, at 47, 115.
176. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 92 (Mar. 24,
2000) [hereinafter Aleksovski Appeals Judgment].
177. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, and Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals
Judgment (Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Delalic Appeals Judgment].
178. Id. at 15, 1 47.
179. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 12, 237.
180. Id.
181. Id. 1 239.
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2. The ICJ's Genocide Judgment' 2
The massacre committed at Srebrenica in July 1995 had been
found to constitute the crime of genocide within the meaning of
Articles II and III, paragraph (a) of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). "3
The ICJ's starting point was the question of whether the massacre
was attributable in whole or in part to the Respondent, Serbia,
alone at the time of the judgment.
This question may be broken down into two parts.' 4 The first
question is whether organs of the Respondent perpetrated the acts
committed at Srebrenica, i.e., whether the acts were committed by
persons or entities whose conduct is necessarily attributable to the'
Respondent because they are in fact the instruments of its action.'
If this question is answered in the negative, the next question is
whether the acts in question were committed by persons who were
not organs of the Respondent, but did, nevertheless, act on the
instructions or under the control of the Respondent.'" The first
question was answered in the negative by the Court on the basis
that the persons (Scorpions, Mladic) and entities (Republika
Srpska and VRS) that committed the acts of genocide at
Srebrenica did not have such ties with the FRY that they could be
deemed to have been "completely dependent" on it.'87 The Court
also found that neither the Republika Srpska nor the VRS were de
jure organs of the FRY since none of them had the status of organ
of that state under its internal law. This conclusion was reached by
looking into Article 4 of the ILC Articles on state responsibility."

182. Id. See generally Vojin Dimitrijevic & Marko Milanovic, The Strange Story of the
Bosnian Genocide Case, 21 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 65, 65-94 (2008).

183. Article II states, "In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious groups, as such: (a) Killing members of the group .... Article III states, "The

following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide ......
184. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 12, 9 384.
185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Id. 191 386, 395.
188. Id. 91388. Article 4 of the ILC states as follows:
Conduct of organs of a State - 1. The conduct of any State organ shall be
considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position
it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ
of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ

20081

The Solange-Method

Having concluded that the persons who committed the
massacres were not organs of the Respondent, the ICJ next had to
determine whether these persons nevertheless acted on the
Respondent's instructions or under its direction or control." In
other words, the ICJ had to determine whether the authors of the
Srebrenica genocide could be considered de facto organs of the
FRY.' 90
In order to resolve this question the ICJ looked at Article 8 of
the ILC Articles on state responsibility, which reads:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a state under international law if the
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that
state in carrying out the conduct.9 '
The ICJ then examined its jurisprudence on the subject, in
particular the Nicaragua case. 92 There, the court was confronted
with the question of the responsibility of the United States for
actions by the Contras forces in Nicaragua. 93 The court held that
there would be no state responsibility in the absence of evidence of
actual "effective control" of military operations, whereas
manifestly the United States would be answerable for the actions
of its own armed forces and covert operations.' The test is
whether the alleged acts were perpetrated in accordance with the
state's instructions, or under the state's "effective control."'95 The
state's instructions must have been given with respect to each
operation and not generally with respect to overall actions.'96

includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the
internal law of the State.
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 4, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter ILC
State Responsibility].
189. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 12, $ 396.
190. Id. $1397.
191. ILC State Responsibility, supra note 188, at art. 8 (emphasis added).
192. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 12, $ 399.
193. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 1.C.J. 14, 62, 109 (June 27).
194. Id. at 64.
195. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 12, 400.
196. Id.
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The Applicant objected to the use of the "effective control"
test, arguing instead that the "overall control" test, used by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber (ICTY) in the Tadic case, 197 was more
appropriate under the circumstances.'98 The ICJ strongly rejected
the reasoning of the ICTY. The Court explained that the ICTY's
jurisdiction is criminal and applies only to persons. 99 Accordingly,
the Court believed the ICTY's findings on the question of state
responsibility were outside the scope of its jurisdiction." To soften
the blow on its confinement of the ICTY's jurisdiction, the ICJ
restated that it attaches the "utmost importance to the factual and
legal findings made by the ICTY. 20' Nonetheless, the ICJ went on
to state that although it will accept the factual and legal findings
made by the ICTY on criminal liability of an accused, it will not
accept its positions on issues of general international law,
especially when this is outside its jurisdiction and unnecessary.2 "
The ICJ further held that although the "overall control" test
may be suitable to determine whether an armed conflict is
international, that issue was not applicable to the case at hand and
was therefore, not considered. 3 The Court was not persuaded by
the argument that the "overall control" test was applicable to find
a state responsible for acts committed by armed forces which were
not among its official organs.2" The ICJ continued to criticize the
ICTY, finding the "overall control" test "unsuitable," and stating
that the test "has the major drawback of broadening the scope of
State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle
governing the law of international responsibility: a State is
responsible only for its own conduct.... 205 In fact, according to
the ICJ, the ICTY stretches "too far, almost to breaking point, the
connection which must exist between the conduct of a State's
organs and its international responsibility."9 9

197. Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 167, at 62, 145.
198. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supranote 12, 402.
199. Id. 403.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. ,404.
204. Id.
205. Id. 406.
206. Id.
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By rejecting the ICTY's unauthorized "overall control" test
and applying the "effective control" test, the ICJ was left with no
option but to find that it had not been established that the
massacres at Srebrenica were committed on the instructions, or
under the direction, of organs of the Respondent state, or that the
Respondent exercised effective control over the operations. 7
3. Analysis
The disagreement between the ICJ and ICTY on such a
fundamental point of general international law, while operating
under the same UN umbrella, seriously undermines the
consistency and uniformity of international law. The ICJ's
Genocide judgment further fragments the already divergent
jurisprudence on this point.
It is highly questionable whether the ICJ is competent to limit
the jurisdiction of the ICTY. In so doing, the ICJ is preventing an
independent tribunal from expressing its own views on
fundamental questions of general international law. The ICTY
considers such expression of views a necessary part of rendering its
judgments.
The ICJ is not in a position to establish a hierarchy by
imposing itself as the highest UN court regarding issues of general
international law. Unlike the hierarchy that exists between the
ECJ and national courts of the EC member states, there is no
hierachy between the ICJ and ICTY. Rather, any international
court charged with applying a specific body of international law is
authorized to apply rules belonging to other bodies of
international law. This authority is part and parcel of the inherent
jurisdiction of any international court or tribunal.2" Accordingly, as
Antonio Cassese, the first President of the ICTY, has rightly
pointed out, the ICJ was wrong to argue that the ICTY Appeals
Chamber was outside the confines of its jurisdiction by dealing
with an issue of state responsibility."
In order to preserve the unity and consistency of international
law, it is preferable that these courts and tribunals issue their
judgments in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ICJ.
Nevertheless, there may be good reasons to develop and apply
207. Id. 413.
208. Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ
Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 649,662 (2007).
209. Id.
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different interpretations of international law in specific cases or
areas of law which deviate from the ICJ's point of view. The ICJ
should respect the existing jurisdiction and expertise of specialized
courts by showing more deference.
According to Cassese, international courts like the ICJ are
entitled to challenge the validity of the ICTY's tests."' When they
do, he suggests that they should "assail" judgments like Tadic on
the merits.21' He writes that the ICJ "should not be confined to the
flimsy argument that Tadic was about the nature of armed
conflicts whereas Nicaragua revolved around state responsibility
and therefore the two tests
' 1'2 2 may coexist in that they relate to
different subject-matters.

Finally, ICJ

judge

and

Vice-President

A1-Khasawneh
2 13

presented another view in his dissenting opinion.

He did not

consider the Nicaragua case's "effective control" test suitable to
questions of state responsibility for international crimes committed
with a common purpose." According to him, the "overall control"
test for attribution established in the Tadic case by the ICTY is
more appropriate when the commission of international crimes is
the common objective of the controlling state and the non-state
actors." The ICJ's refusal to infer genocidal intent from consistent
conduct in Bosnia and Herzegovina is inconsistent with the
established jurisprudence of the ICTY.2 6
Al-Khasawneh went on to say that the ICJ applied the
"effective control" test to a situation different from that presented
in the Nicaragua case. In the present case, there was a unity of
goals, unity of ethnicity and a common ideology, such that
"effective control" over non-state actors would not be necessary."'
The ICJ's rejection of the standard in the Tadic case fails to
address the crucial issue raised therein, namely, that different

210. Id. at 663.
211. Id.
212. Id. (emphasis in original).
213. Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President AI-Khasawneh,
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/91/13689.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). See also Dissenting opinion of
Judge Ad Hoc Mahiou, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13706.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,
2009).
214. Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, supra note 213, pmbl.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 10, 36.
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types of activities, particularly in the ever evolving nature of armed
conflict, may call for subtle variations in the rules of attribution."'
In his conclusion, A1-Khasawneh stated that the ICJ required
too high a threshold for control-one that did not accord with the
facts of
219 this case nor with the relevant jurisprudence of the
ICTY.

In sum, by bashing the ICTY, the ICJ increased the divide
between the already deeply divergent approaches of international
courts regarding the issue of responsibility. In fact, it would not be
surprising if the ICTY or another court felt even less inclined to
close this gap in future judgments. Therefore, it can only be hoped,
together with Cassese, that in the future, the ICJ will look into
state practice and case law instead of simply reiterating its own
previous decisions. 22' Nevertheless, such a hope may be shattered if

one agrees with South African judge and international war crimes
prosecutor, Richard J. Goldstone, and international law scholar,
Rebecca J. Hamilton, that "the ICJ was
' 2 1 fairly measured in its
response to the issue in Serbia v. Bosnia.

F. The Bosphorus Case222
1. The Facts
The Bosphorus case concerned the implementation of UN
sanctions against former Yugoslavia. Bosphorus was leasing an
airplane from the state-owned Yugoslav airline JAT.223 Due to UN
sanctions, which were implemented by a European Community
(EC) regulation, the plane was impounded by Irish authorities. 24
Bosphorus started proceedings against that measure which
eventually reached the ECJ. The ECJ ruled that the measures
were acceptable in order to attain the objectives of the UN
sanctions."' Following that ruling, Bosphorus started proceedings
218. Id. at 11, 39.
219. Id. at 17, 62.
220. Cassesse, supra note 208, at 668.
221. Richard J.Goldstone & Rebecca J. Hamilton, Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the
Encounterof the InternationalCourt of Justice with the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
the Former Yugoslavia, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 95, 101 (2008).

222.
Transp.,
223.
224.
225.

Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for
Energy & Commc'ns, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3953.
Id. $12.
Id. $[1 3-4.
Id. $f 23-27.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

312

[Vol. 30:275

against Ireland before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), claiming that the measure violated its fundamental
rights as protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Council of
Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (CPHRFF), which protects the right to
property. 26 The ECtHR was thus called upon to review in effect
the EC measure and the Bosphorus judgment of the ECJ.
227
2. The ECtHR's Bosphorus Judgment
The ECtHR started its analysis by repeating its position it had
already adopted in Matthews:? that EC law measures could be

reviewed - indirectly - and that EC member states could not hide

behind an international organization.2"9
However, the ECtHR shied away from actually performing
that review. Instead, the ECtHR explicitly
3 applied the Solangemethod for the first time vis-A-vis the ECJ.
In its first step, the ECtHR held that the amount of
fundamental rights protection that exists within the EC, including
the available procedures for obtaining judicial review before the
ECJ, is equivalent though not identical to that which exists at the
ECtHR

level.'

Consequently,

a

presumption

of

sufficient

fundamental rights protection within the EC existed.
226. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1.

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Matthews v. U.K., 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 361.
Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 45-46, 155-57.
See id. 1 155-57. Regarding the Solange-model, see Lavranos, Das So-Lange-

Prinzip, supra note 3, at 79-92; J.-P. Jacqud, Droit Communautaire et Convention
Europ~enne des Droits de 'Homme, l'Arret Bosphorus, une Jurisprudence'Solange H' de
la Cour Europ~enne des Droits de l'Homme?, 41 (3) REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
EUROPEEN [REV. TRIM. DR. EUR.] 749, 749-768 (2005) (Fr.).

231. Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 155.
155. In the Court's view, State action taken in compliance with such legal
obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to

protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered
and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be
considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides (see the
above-cited M. & Co. decision, at p. 145, an approach with which the parties and
the European Commission agreed). By "equivalent" the Court means
"comparable": any requirement that the organisation's protection be "identical"
could run counter to the interest of international co-operation pursued
(paragraph 150 above). However, any such finding of equivalence could not be
final and would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in
fundamental rights protection.
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In a second step, the ECtHR explicitly held that as long as
that fundamental rights protection is "not manifestly deficient" in
a specific case, the ECtHR would not exercise its jurisdiction.232 In
other words, the ECtHR will, in principle, refrain from reviewing
EC law measures including ECJ judgments unless a specific case
reveals a "manifestly deficient" protection of fundamental rights
within the EC.233 Only in such a situation would the ECtHR review
EC law measures. Unfortunately, the ECtHR did not define what
"manifestly deficient" actually means or when that threshold could
be reached.2 4" Nonetheless, the ECtHR concluded that in this case
there was no "manifestly deficient" fundamental rights protection.
Accordingly, the ECtHR in substance rejected Bosphorus' claim. 5

156. If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the
organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the
requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation.
However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a
particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was
manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international co-operation
would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a "constitutional instrument of
European public order" in the field of human rights (Loizidou v. Turkey
(preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, § 75).

[...
1

165. In such circumstances, the Court finds that the protection of fundamental
rights by EC law can be considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time,
"equivalent" (within the meaning of paragraph 155 above) to that of the
Convention system. Consequently, the presumption arises that Ireland did not
depart from the requirements of the Convention when it implemented legal
obligations flowing from its membership of the EC (see paragraph 156).
Id. (emphasis added).
232. Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 156.
233. Thus, the ECHR concluded:
166. The Court has had regard to the nature of the interference, to the general
interest pursued by the impoundment and by the sanctions regime and to the
ruling of the ECJ (in the light of the opinion of the Advocate General), a ruling
with which the Supreme Court was obliged to and did comply. It considers it
clear that there was no dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the
observance of Convention rights.
In the Court's view, therefore, it cannot be said that the protection of the
applicant's Convention rights was manifestly deficient with the consequence that
the relevant presumption of Convention compliance by the respondent State has
not been rebutted.
Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 166.
234. See, e.g., Cathryn Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of
Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe, 6 HuM. RTS. L.
REv. 87, 101-02 (2006).
235. Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 165.
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3. Analysis
It appears to be the first time that the ECtHR explicitly
applied the Solange-method in order to delimit its jurisprudence
vis-A-vis the ECJ's jurisdiction. In this way, the ECtHR was able to
solve a very sensitive and delicate issue, at least for the time being,
very elegantly.
The issue was to determine which court was the supreme
court for reviewing human rights in Europe. Rather than
answering that question the ECtHR displayed comity towards the
ECJ by applying the "as long as" approach. At the same time, the
ECtHR kept a reserve jurisdiction towards the ECJ by asserting
that it will apply and enforce the CPHRFF vis-A-vis Community
law if necessary.23 6
In return, the ECJ has given the CPHRFF a special place
within the Community legal order and even applied the CPHRFF
directly in its jurisprudence.237 In its Schmidberger-judgment the
ECJ accepted a restriction even of primary .EC law (one of the
four freedoms of the internal market were at issue) in order to give
full effect to CPHRFF rights.23 In other words, under certain
circumstances the ECJ will give primacy to the CPHRFF above
Community law. In this way, the ECJ showed comity by sending a
clear message to the ECtHR that it takes the CPHRFF very
seriously. Accordingly, both European courts displayed comity
towards each other by allowing each court to "reign over their own
kingdoms" without having to fear any interference from each
other, apart from exceptional cases. It will be interesting to see
whether this seemingly harmonious coexistence can be sustained
once the EU accedes to the CPHRFF, as stipulated in the new
European Constitution, thereby submitting the ECJ to the final
authority of the ECtHR.

236. See generally I. Canor, Primus Inter Pares. Who is the Ultimate Guardian of
Fundamental Rights in Europe?, 25 EUR. L. REV. 3, 3-21 (2000); Sionaidh Douglas-Scott,
A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourgand the Growing EuropeanHuman Rights
Acquis, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 629, 629-65 (2006).
237. See, e.g., Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't., 2002
E.C.R. 1-7091; Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't., 2002 E.C.R.
1-6279.
238. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5659.
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III. THE SOLANGE-METHOD AS A TOOL FOR REGULATING
COMPETING JURISDICTIONS

The case studies discussed above illustrate that among
different judicial bodies, the issue of competing jurisdictions is
approached quite differently, resulting in either more fragmenting
or more unifying effects. At one end of the spectrum are cases
such as the OSPAR arbitral tribunal award, the ECJ's judgment in
the MOX Plant dispute, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body
rulings in Mexico Soft Drinks, the WTO Appellate Body ruling in
Brazilian Tyres, and the ICJ's Genocide judgment, each of which
show little comity towards the possible jurisdiction of other courts
or tribunals involved in the respective disputes."' The other end of
the spectrum is comprised of cases such as the UNCLOS arbitral
tribunal award and the WTO panel ruling in Brazilian Tyres. The
WTO panel ruling respected the jurisdiction of the other court or
tribunal by either staying the proceedings to allow the other body
to express its view regarding jurisdictional competition or
accepting the decision rendered by the other court or tribunal as a
fact of the case and taking the decision fully into account. 20 The
ECtHR's Bosphorus judgment also falls within this second
category by showing comity towards the ECJ, while at the same
time reserving jurisdiction in order to intercede in ECJ matters if
necessary.
The Izeren Rijn arbitral tribunal falls in the middle of the
spectrum. While discussing the possibility that the ECJ might have
jurisdiction in the dispute, the tribunal eventually concluded,
based on a flawed analysis, that the ECJ had no jurisdiction and
thus, rendered its award. 2 The lIzeren Rijn arbitral tribunal,
however, did acknowledge the idea of comity."3
The Solange-method, illustrated in the Bosphorus judgment
will be examined in more detail in the following sections. The first
239. See OSPAR Final Award, supra note 6, 1 143; Comm'n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. I4635, 177; Tax Measures Panel Report, supra note 10, %7.1; Mexico Appellate Body
Report, supra note 103,
57; Brazil Appellate Body Report, supra note 11,
228;
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 12, 403.
240. See MOX Plant (No. 3) (Ir. v. U.K.), supranote 38, 1 28-30; Brazil Panel Report,
supra note 124, $$ 7.272-7.278.
241. See Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. $$ 155-56.
242. See Iron Rhine Arbitration (Belg. v. Neth.), $$ 103, 119, 137 (Perm Ct. Arb.
2005), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagjid=1155.
243. See id. $$ 102-103.
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section will summarize the origins of the Solange-method, while
the second section will identify the legal basis for the Solangemethod. On that basis, the third section will illustrate how the
application of the Solange-method in the various cases would have
produced a different result by regulating the jurisdictional
competition more adequately.
A. The Origins of the Solange-Method and Solange-Jurisprudence
of the BVerfG
The Solange-method was developed by the German Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (hereinafter
BVerfG) in order to regulate its jurisdiction vis-A-vis the ECJ.2"
For the purposes of this article, several key aspects of the
BVerfG's Solange-jurisprudence will be discussed.2 5
It should be noted that the development of this jurisprudence,
which originated in the first Solange judgment in 1974 (hereinafter
Solange I), ,6has not been linear, but rather, has taken the form of
waves, with corresponding high and low points. The high points
reflect times in which the BVerfG was prepared to relinquish more
of its "reserve jurisdiction. ' .. The low points indicate when the
BVerfG assumed or reassumed more jurisdictional powers."

It should also be noted that the Solange-method was
introduced because the supremacy claim of the ECJ coupled with
the expanding development of Community law collided with the
protection of fundamental rights as guaranteed by the national
constitutions of the member states. 9 In particular, the BVerfG

244. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV.
429, 445 (2003).
245. See Nikolaos Lavranos, Towards a Solange-Method Between International Court
and Tribunals, in THE ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS

IN HONOUR OF PROF. R. LAPIDOTH (Youval Shany & Tomer Broude eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Lavranos, Towards a Solange-Method]; NIKOLAOS LAVRANOS, DECISIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN AND DOMESTIC LEGAL
ORDERS OF SELECTED EU MEMBER STATES, 148-54 (Europa Law Publishing 2004)
[hereinafter LAVRANOS, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS].

246. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] May 29, 1974, 37, 271 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Solange 1].

247. Entscheidungen
des
Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfGE]
[Federal
Constitutional Court ] Oct. 22, 1986, 73, 339 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Solange If].
248. Entscheidungen
des
Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfGE]
[Federal
Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89, 155 106 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Solange Ill].
249. Mark Killian Brewer, The European Union and Legitimacy: Time for a European
Constitution,34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 555, 567 (2001).
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considered fundamental rights as a "no-go area" for the ECJ. 25°
The BVerfG kept at all times a "reserve jurisdiction" in this area,
considering itself always competent to exert its jurisdiction despite
the ECJ's presence (which in the eyes of the ECJ is of an exclusive
nature) .21

The Solange I case concerned the question of what domestic
courts should do when there is a conflict between a provision of an
EC Regulation and fundamental rights protected by the German
Constitution. 2 The BVerfG held that as long as the integration
process of the EC does not contain a catalogue of fundamental
rights that is adequate to the German Constitution and has not
been duly approved by the German Parliament, a German court
may request a ruling from the BVerfG as to the compatibility of
the EC measure with the German Constitution. 3 Yet, this may
25' In
occur only after requesting a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.
substance, the BVerfG concluded that in this case there was no
conflict between the EC measure and the German Constitution."
Nonetheless, the BVerfG found it necessary to emphasize that it
did not consider the level of fundamental rights protection at the
EC level to be sufficient, in particular, because no EC catalog of
fundamental rights comparable to those in the German
Constitution existed at the EC level."6 Consequently, since
fundamental rights had not been explicitly recognized in the
jurisprudence of the ECJ at that time, the BVerfG considered
itself unable to relinquish its jurisdiction regarding fundamental
rights protection in lieu of exclusive ECJ jurisdiction. 7
The ECJ subsequently picked up on the BVerfG's signal and
began to develop jurisprudence on fundamental rights
protection. 8 In recognition of that development, the BVerfG
conceded parts of its jurisdiction under certain conditions when it
issued its second Solange-judgment in 1986 (hereinafter

250. Id. at 570.
251. Id. at 570, 580.
252. Solange 1,supra note 246.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Brewer, supra note 249, at 570.
258. See, e.g., Case 4/73, Nold v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507-8; Case 44/79, Hauer v.
Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3744-50.
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Solange II)."9 In that case, the main issue was whether an ECJ
judgment on the interpretation and application of EC law must be
considered final, or whether it was still reviewable by the BVerfG
if conflict with fundamental rights protected by the German
Constitution were established."6 In its Solange II judgment, the
BVerfG held that as long as the case law of the ECJ offered
effective protection of fundamental rights against the acts of public
organs (i.e., EC organs), which is comparable to the minimum
level of guarantees by the German Constitution, the BVerfG will
not exercise its jurisdiction in reviewing EC law measures. In
other words, the BVerfG determined that the ECJ's interpretation
of EC law was authoritative and final, thereby binding all German
courts -including the BVerfG itself.
Thus, after Solange H, the relationship between the ECJ and
the BVerfG was back on track. Indeed, the ECJ continued its
approach of explicitly integrating fundamental rights into the
Community legal order by issuing several bold judgments on the
subject (despite or because of the lack of a written catalogue of EC
fundamental rights). 62 It should be noted, however, that in its
Opinion 2/94, the ECJ did not "submit" itself to the jurisdiction of
the ECHR; the ECJ rejected the possibility of EC accession to the
ECHR.263
But in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty came onto the European
stage and introduced new tensions on the ECJ/BVerfG
relationship. The Maastricht Treaty certified the ECJ
jurisprudence on fundamental rights protection by explicitly
referring to the fundamental rights as protected by the common
constitutional traditions of the member states and the ECHR in
M
the EU Treaty."
Yet, the other novel and far-reaching

259. Solange II, supra note 247.
260. Id.
261. Brewer, supra note 249, at 572.
262. See, e.g., Case C-260/89, ERT v. DEP, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, 2963-64; Case 5/88,
Wachauf v. F.R.G., 1989 E.C.R. 2609, 2639. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Jurisprudenceof
Human Rights in The European Union, Integration and Disintegration, Values and Processes
(Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int'l & Reg'I Econ. Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2, 1996), available
at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/96/9602.html.
263. Opinion 2/94, GATT v. WTO, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 1789.
264. See Treaty on European Union arts. 6, 46, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1

[hereinafter TEU]. Article 6 reads as follows:
1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which
are common to the Member States.
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components of the Treaty-the EMU and the Euro, Common
Foreign and Security Policy and Police and Justice Cooperationwere too much for the BVerfG to accept. Hence, in its Solange III
judgment, the BVerfG de facto overturned its Solange II
jurisprudence by allowing for the non-application of EC law in
Germany under certain conditions (the so-called ausbrechender
Gemeinschaftsakt).265

In its third Solange judgment on the Maastricht Treaty, the
BVerfG made clear that the future development of the EU
remains under conditional approval of the BVerfG while allowing
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by Germany.266 Thus, the
BVerfG reasserted its "reserve jurisdiction" and signaled to the
ECJ that it was prepared to question the doctrine of supremacy of
EC law and consequently, the authority of the ECJ. In other
words, the BVerfG challenged the ECJ's self-declared supremacy
over national laws and institutions, whose impact largely depends
on voluntary submission by national courts. At that time, the
relationship between the BVerfG and the ECJ had become frosty,
to say the least.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community
law.
[...I
Article 46 reads as follows:
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community concerning the powers of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the exercise of those
powers shall apply only to the following provisions of this Treaty:
[...
I
(d) Article 6(2) [TEU] with regard to action of the institutions, in so far as the
Court has jurisdiction under the Treaties establishing the European
Communities under this Treaty;
[...1
265. See Solange III, supra note 248, $ 106, where the BVerfG defined the conditions
of "ausbrechender Gemeinschaftsakt" as follows:
If European organs would apply and develop the EU Treaty in a way that is not
covered anymore by the German Act ratifying the EU Treaty, than the
measures resulting thereof would not be binding in Germany. The German
organs would be prevented by reason of German Constitutional law to apply
them. Accordingly, the BVerfG reviews whether the acts of European organs
remain within the limits of the German ratification act or go beyond that
(translation by author).
266. Solange III, supra note 248.
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The vigilant attitude taken by the BVerfG towards the ECJ
was justified, at least from the perspective of the BVerfG (as well
as large parts of the German academia), by the position adopted
by the ECJ and the Court of First Instance (CFI) towards the EC
"banana regulation" and its alleged conflict with WTO law. In
short, German importers claimed that the EC banana regulation
completely disrupted their import opportunities because the
regulation made imports from Central and South America much
more expensive. This, the importers argued, constituted a violation
of their fundamental rights over property. Moreover, they argued
that the inconsistency of the banana regulation, specifically the
interaction of a lower norm (EC banana regulation) with a higher
norm (EC Treaty, ECHR), could not be accepted on the basis of
the rule of law and the ECHR. However, the ECJ and CFI were
not prepared to review the compatibility of the EC banana
regulation with WTO law or fundamental rights protected by the
ECHR and/or national constitutions. 8 Thus, the ECJ/CFI left the
EC banana regulation intact.
Moreover, in parallel proceedings before German courts, the
importers claimed that this also constituted a violation of the
German ratification act of the EC Treaty and, therefore, should
have been qualified as an "ausbrechender Gemeinschaftsakt"
within the meaning of Solange III.
Yet, by the time the BVerfG was finally called upon by the
Frankfurt Administrative Court to remove the banana regulation
(by qualifying it as "ausbrechender Gemeinschaftsakt"), the
BVerfG's composition, in the wake of the Solange III ruling, had
changed. Apparently, the BVerfG now found that the time was
right to offer the ECJ a "peace treaty" by essentially giving up the
' As a result, the
concept of "ausbrechender Gemeinschaftsakt."269
267. For a detailed discussion, see Ulrich Everling, Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The
BananasJudgment of the ECJ and National Courts, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 401, 401-37
(1996). See generally Nikolaos Lavranos, Die Rechtswirkung von WTO Panel Reports im
Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrecht Sowie
im
Deutschen Verfassungsrecht, 34
EUROPARECHT 289, 289-308 (1999) [hereinafter Lavranos, Die Rechtswirkung von WTO
Panel Reports].
268. See Nikolaos Lavranos, The Communitarization of WTO Dispute Settlement
Reports: An Exception to the Rule of Law, 10 EUR. FOREIGN AFF.REV. 313, 313-38 (2005)
[hereinafter Lavranos, Communitarization].

269. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 7,
2000, 102 147 (F.R.G.). See generally I. Pernice, Les Bananes et les Droits Fondamentaux:
La Cour ConstitutionnelleAllemande Fait le Point, 37 CASHIER DE DERIOT EUROPEEN
427, 427-40 (2001); Constance Grewe, Le 'traite de paix' avec la Cour de Luxembourg:

2008]

The Solange-Method

BVerfG held in its Solange TV judgment that it would review EC
law measures only if the minimum level of fundamental rights
protection would no longer be guaranteed by the EC organs on a
general level.
So, even though the possibility of declaring an EC law
measure as an "ausbrechender Gemeinschaftsakt" still remains
possible, the necessary conditions for this are extremely difficult to
meet. In effect, only an act of the EC that goes completely against
basic fundamental rights on a general level-and not only in one
or several specific cases-would meet these criteria. Hence, the
BVerfG reverted back to its second Solange decision, thereby fully
accepting the jurisdiction of the ECJ while also limiting its own
"reserve jurisdiction."
This honeymoon, however, did not last long because the ECJ
trespassed on another "holy ground": member states' criminal law.
While member states had accepted that criminal law was an
important and necessary component of the EU, as illustrated by its
third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs, renamed Police and Justice
Cooperation), member states clearly did not intend to bring
criminal law into the first pillar (the Community) and delegate to
the EC the ability to impose criminal law obligations with
supranational force (that is, endow it with supremacy over the
national laws of the member states). Yet, the ECJ apparently
thought otherwise, by rendering groundbreaking judgments in
Pupino and Commission v. Council. 2
L'arret de la Cour ConstitutionnelleAllemande du 76.2000 Relatifau Reglement du Marche
de la Banane, 37 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [REV. TRIM. DR. EUR.] 1,
1-17 (2001) (Fr.).
270. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court]
June 7, 2000, 102 147 (F.R.G.), where the BVerfG defined the conditions as follows:
Thus even after the decision in Solange III, requests by national courts before
the BVerfG are inadmissible if they do not argue that the required level of
fundamental rights protection within the EC, including ECJ case-law, has fallen
below the standard as determined in Solange II. Accordingly, a request must
prove in detail that a violation of fundamental rights by secondary EC law
measures is general and that the level of protection has fallen . below the
minimum level as determined by the German Constitution (translation by
author).
The crucial condition is that a violation of fundamental rights by secondary EC law (such
as the EC bananas regulation) must be specifically proven by showing that the absolute
minimum level of fundamental rights is generally not guaranteed anymore.
271. Case C-105/03, Pupino, 2005 E.C.R. 1-5285. See also Eleanor Spaventa, Opening
Pandora'sBox: Some Reflections on the ConstitutionalEffects of the Decision in Pupino,3
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 5, 5-24 (2007).
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In Pupino, the ECJ, for the first time, stated that national
courts must apply and interpret their national criminal procedural
law as far as possible in accordance with the third pillar.273 In other
words, a similar supremacy effect as the first pillar must be
attached to the third pillar vis-A-vis national law.274
Further, in Commission v. Council, the ECJ, for the first time,
explicitly held that criminal law measures can be prescribed by the
Community legislature for the purpose of maximum enforcement
of EC law (in this case EC environmental law measures)."' This
meant that criminal law measures such as minimum and maximum
fines and prison terms could be prescribed by EC law measures
(i.e., first pillar measures).
Accordingly, criminal law has entered the Community legal
order and continues to expand."6 When this development is
combined with the continuous stream of far-reaching legislation in
the third pillar, there is a forceful impact of EU law on national
competencies in criminal law issues, which increasingly affects
individuals directly.277
Therefore, when the BVerfG had the opportunity to rule on
the German law implementing the European Arrest Warrant
(EAW),2 78 it is not surprising that it returned to its Solange formula
as developed in its Maastrichtjudgment (Solange III). The EAW
case concerned the issue of the constitutionality of the German act
implementing the EAW, which was adopted within the third pillar
as an EU Framework Decision. The crucial novelty of the EAW is
the automatic binding force that is given to arrest orders from any
EU member state and their automatic mutual recognition. In other
words, a member state that is requested to arrest and transfer a
citizen (including its own nationals) to another EU member state
is no longer able to review such a decision.
272. Case C-176/03, Comm'n v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. 1-7879. See also J. Prinssen,
Doctrinal Legal Effects of EU Criminal Law: A Transfer of EC Law Doctrines?, in
INTERFACE BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW 313-31 (N. Lavranos & D.
Obradovic eds., 2007).

273. Prinssen, supra note 272, at 321.
274. Id. at 326.

275. Comm'n v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. 1-7879, 1 48.
276. See Case C-440/05, Comm'n v. Council, 2007 E.C.R. 1-0000.
277. See generally Anthony Dowes & Orla Lynskey, The Ever-Longer Arm of EC
Law: The Extension of Community Competence into the Field of Criminal Law, 45
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 131,131-58 (2008).

278. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 18,
2005, 113 273 (F.R.G.).
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The BVerfG, however, held that despite the current level of
fundamental rights protection guaranteed by the ECJ, the ECHR,
and other EU member states, these protections could not affect or
exclude the possibility of judicial review by the BVerfG in
individual cases as guaranteed by the German Constitution. 79
Accordingly, the "reserve jurisdiction" of German courts, and
ultimately of the BVerfG, remains intact.
In other words, the BVerfG continues to exercise its
jurisdiction regarding third pillar measures irrespective of the
existence of any (limited) ECJ jurisdiction in this area. Hence, in
policy areas that inevitably affect fundamental rights in a
substantial way, such as in matters of police and judicial
cooperation (third pillar), the BVerfG is not yet prepared to limit
its jurisdiction in the same way as it did regarding first pillar cases.
Accordingly, one can now distinguish between a rather limited
BVerfG "reserve jurisdiction" in first pillar cases and a rather
broad "reserve jurisdiction" in third pillar cases.
In sum, it can be concluded that the Solange method has been
used by the BVerfG in a flexible way in order to allow it to
accommodate its jurisdictional relationship with the ECJ
consistent with developments in the ECJ case law, as well as
developments on the more general European political scene.
Accordingly, the Solange method enables the BVerfG to limit its
jurisdiction in favor of the jurisdiction of the ECJ depending on
the existing level of fundamental rights protection at the European
level. In short, high-level fundamental rights protection means
limited interference from the BVerfG, while low-level
fundamental rights protection means more interference from the
BVerfG. But this flexibility should not be misunderstood as
implying a complete renunciation of jurisdiction, since the BVerfG
has always kept its "reserve jurisdiction".
B. The Legal Basis of the Solange-Method
The previous section illustrated that the roots of the Solange
method are to be found in constitutional law. Indeed, the Solange
method regulates the vertical jurisdictional relationship between
two supreme courts belonging to two different legal orders (i.e.,
national and European legal order).

279. Id.

118.
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As discussed above, the ECtHR applied the Solange method
in its Bosphorus judgment for regulating its horizontal
jurisdictional relationship vis-A-vis the ECJ. Accordingly, by using
the Solange method, the ECtHR expanded the scope of
application of the Solange method towards the horizontal
relationship between two international (regional) courts (i.e., the
ECJ and ECtHR).
This raises two questions: first, what is the legal basis of
applying the Solange method. at the international level and,
second, to what extent are international judges and arbitrators
obliged to apply the Solange method when confronted with
competing jurisdictions?
Before answering these questions, it should be noted that the
Solange method is considered to be an example of judicial comity.
Accordingly, it is necessary to get a clear understanding of judicial
comity. For this we turn to Professor Yuval Shany, who has
extensively analyzed this term.280 According to Professor Shany,
comity can "create a framework for jurisdictional interaction that
will enable courts and tribunals to apply rules originating in other
judicial institutions. This, in turn, will encourage cross-fertilization
and may result in increased legitimacy of international judgments
[by] utilizing the authority of other international courts and
tribunals.... [I]n the application of the 'best available' rule, [this
will reflect] not merely the narrow interests of the parties and the
law-applying regime at hand but also those of the international
community at large. 281 Professor Shany defines comity as follows:
According to this principle, which is found in many
countries (mostly from common law systems) courts in
one jurisdiction should respect and demonstrate a degree
of deference to the law of other jurisdictions, including the
decisions of judicial bodies operating in the jurisdictions.282
In this context, it should be noted that the terms "comity,"
"international comity," or "judicial comity" are often used
interchangeably; they are amorphous and applied in varying
contextual settings.
280. SHANY, COMPETING JURISDICTIONS, supra note 1.

281. Id. at 261.
282. Id. at 260.
283. See Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping International Comity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 893,
893-952 (1998); Antonio F. Perez, WTO and UN Law: -InstitutionalComity in National

Security, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 301-79 (1998); Ayelet Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, The
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The type of comity we are looking at in this contribution can
be traced back to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in Hilton v.
Guyot (1895), reasoned that "'[c]omity,' in the legal sense, is
neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere courtesy and
good will" with respect to foreign acts, but it is the recognition that
"one nation allows within its territory the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation. ' , 21 More recently, the U.S. Supreme
Court emphasized the need to extend judicial cooperation to
quasi-judicial international tribunals as well.285
Accordingly, comity is not considered as a legal principle
stricto senso, but rather a sort of "gentlemen's agreement"
between courts and tribunals. In other words, every court or
tribunal is totally free to decide whether or not to apply comity in
a certain case and what consequences it attaches to it. If one,
however, looks to basic international law instruments, which is
appropriate since we deal here with comity between international
courts and tribunals, one can find a legal basis for comity.
For example, Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter explicitly notes
that the Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to
that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and
in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law,

adjustment

or

settlement

of

internationaldisputes or 2,86situations which might lead to
a breach of the peace...
This directly applies to all courts and tribunals established by
the United Nations (e.g., the ICJ, ICTY), but arguably also to all
other international courts and tribunals that are called upon to
apply the UN Charter.

Constitution and Conflict-of-Laws Treaties: Upgradingthe International Comity, 29 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 1-34 (2003); Daniel Tan, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing
Problem of Comity, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 283, 283-356 (2005). See generally S. Foster Halabi,
The Comity of Empagran: The Supreme Court Decides that Foreign Competition
Regulation Limits American Antitrust Jurisdiction Over International Cartels, 46 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 279, 279-293 (2005).
284. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
285. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 542 U.S. 241,246 (2004).
286. U.N. Charter art. 1, 1 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, the Preamble of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of the Treaties (VCLT) 1980 explicitly states:
Affirming that disputes concerning treaties, like other
international disputes, should be settled by peaceful
means and in conformity with the principles of justice and
internationallaw... 2 87
Since the VCLT is generally considered to be an expression of
customary international law,2 the principles of justice and
international law applies to all international disputes. Hence, when
international courts and tribunals are called upon to resolve an
international dispute, they must do so in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law.
It is submitted that comity (including the Solange method) is
part of the principles of justice. More specifically, it is argued that
comity must be understood as being an inherent part of the tasks
and functions of a judge or arbitrator to resolve disputes in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law.
Thus, comity can be qualified as being an integral part of the
obligation of all international courts and tribunals and should be
applied when such courts and tribunals are determining whether or
not to exercise their jurisdiction in a specific case brought before
them. In other words, as Professor Petersmann recently (and
convincingly) argued, judicial comity must be considered to be
part of the rule of law and of delivering justice by judges and
arbitrators when resolving a dispute. 29" Besides, it is submitted that
all international courts and tribunals have an obligation to ensure
the efficiency and coherence of the international legal order when
executing their functions.2 91 In short, applying comity (i.e., the
Solange method) must be considered an inherent and fundamental
legal duty of every judge or arbitrator. 2
287. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
Preamble, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added).
288. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 811 (5th ed. 2003).
289. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Do Judges Meet Their ConstitutionalObligation to
Settle Disputes in Conformity with Principles of Justice and InternationalLaw?, EUR. J. OF
LEGAL STUD., 34-35 Dec. 2007 [hereinafter Petersmann, Constitutional Obligation to

Settle Disputes].
290. Id.
291. Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentationof
InternationalLaw: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?,40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 259,

298-99 (2007).
292. Id. at 299.
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If this point of view is accepted, the question arises as to what
this legal duty entails for judges and arbitrators. Essentially, it
entails delivering justice to: (i) parties, (ii) other international
courts and tribunals, and (iii) the rule of law.293
Justice towards the parties means that every court or tribunal
is obliged to resolve a dispute by rendering a decision that is
efficient, fair and final. Thus, parties must be discouraged from
endlessly re-litigating the same dispute (or parts of the same
dispute), while at the same time be encouraged to end their
disputes by accepting the outcome of the first proceeding. Since
the court or tribunal first seized with a dispute can substantially
determine the process, it bears particular responsibility when
deciding whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction.
But at the same time, the courts and tribunals must exercise
its jurisdiction in a way that does not undermine the authority of
the other courts and tribunals whose jurisdiction is also potentially
triggered. So justice towards the other international courts or
tribunals entails showing respect for the other court's jurisdiction
by relinquishing its own jurisdiction, staying the proceeding, or
taking full account of the other court's decision.
This brings us to the third element of justice and that is to
show justice towards international law, more specifically by
preserving the uniform and effective application of international
law. Indeed, in view of the recent multiplication of international
courts and tribunals, it has increasingly becoming vital to
prevent-in one way or another-a fragmentation of international
law (including regional law like EC, NAFTA, or MERCUSOR
law). 94 In other words, courts and tribunals have an inherent
obligation to contribute to the uniform interpretation and
application of international law. The application of comity-for
instance in the form of the Solange-method-forms part of this
obligation.
Accordingly, it is not difficult to find a legal basis for comity.
In fact, comity has a dual legal basis, both in constitutional law and

293. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution:
Proliferation,Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International
Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 273-366 (2006) [hereinafter Petersmann, Justice as
Conflict Resolution].
294. See generally N. Lavranos, JurisdictionalCompetition Between the ECJ and Other
International Courts and Tribunals, 11 EUR. L. REP. 156, 156-71 (2007) [hereinafter
Lavranos, JurisdictionalCompetition].
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international law.295 This allows comity to be transposed from the
national law level to the international law level.
Comity is also confirmed by the UN General Assembly,
which adopted an Outcome document at the 2005 World Summit.
The document explicitly states:
Pacific settlement of disputes
73. We emphasize the obligation of States to settle their
disputes by peaceful means in accordance with Chapter
VI of the Charter, including, when appropriate, by the
use of the International Court of Justice. All States
should act in accordance with the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.

[. ..

Rule of law
134. Recognizing the need for universaladherence to and
implementation of the rule of law at both the national
and internationallevels [emphasis added], we:
(a) Reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and
principles of the Charter and international law and to an
international order based on the rule of law and
international law, which is essential for peaceful
coexistence and cooperation among
States; [emphasis added]
[. . .

(f) Recognize the important role of the International
Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, in adjudicating disputes among States
and the value of its work, call upon States that have not
yet done so to consider accepting the jurisdiction of the
Court in accordance with its Statute and consider means
of strengthening the Court's work, including by
supporting the Secretary-General's Trust Fund to Assist
States in the Settlement of Disputes through the
International Court of Justice on a voluntary basis.2"
Applying comity is part of the inherent power of the judiciary,
and more specifically an inherent obligation of the very judge or
arbitrator. In other words, all international courts and tribunals are

295. See SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 1.
296. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1,
73, 134, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1
(Oct. 25, 2005).
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obliged to apply the Solange-method when confronted with
competing jurisdictions.
C. The Application of the Solange-Method
at the InternationalLaw Level
Accordingly, it seems an interesting exercise to apply the
Solange-method in those case studies in which it was not applied to
determine what the effects of its application would have been.
Thus, in this section, the Solange-method is tested hypothetically
in all the case studies with the exception of the UNCLOS arbitral
award in the MOX Plant dispute and the Bosphorus judgment of
the ECtHR, where the Solange-method was already applied.
In the MOX Plant dispute, instead of seizing its jurisdiction,
the ECJ could have opted for declining its jurisdiction by applying
the Solange-method and referring the parties back to the
UNCLOS arbitral tribunal for a final decision. In this way, the
ECJ could have respected the existing jurisdiction of the UNCLOS
arbitral tribunal and stopped the parties from re-litigating the
dispute before the ECJ, where there would be a danger of
potentially conflicting rulings. This would also have considerably
shortened the length of proceedings.297 Such a move by the ECJ
would have been particularly risk-free in this case, since the
UNCLOS arbitral tribunal showed so much consideration for the
ECJ jurisdiction that it can be assumed that it would have shown
similar consideration to the relevant ECJ jurisprudence. Thus, the
risk of a possible divergent or conflicting ruling by the UNCLOS
arbitral tribunal would have been very low. Similarly, there was no
reason for the ECJ to worry about the uniform application of EC
law within the EC member states. As discussed above, however,
the ECJ did not show any signs of applying the Solange-method
towards the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal or any other international
court or tribunal. Instead, the ECJ opted for claiming maximum
exclusive jurisdiction.9

297. It should be noted that even though the ECJ judgment in the MOX Plant dispute
in which it seized jurisdiction regarding UNCLOS dates back to May 30, 2006, the
UNCLOS arbitral tribunal terminated the proceeding only on June 6, 2008 without
discussing the merits of the case. See Order No. 6, Termination of Proceedings, Permanent
Court of Arbitration, The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.) (June 6, 2008), http://www.pcacpa.org/upload/files/MOX%20Plant%200rder%2ONo. %206.pdf.
298. Comm'n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 135.
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Similarly, the OSPAR arbitral tribunal was not inclined to
apply the Solange-method. If it had applied the Solange-method
and consequently declined its jurisdiction, the parties' next option
would have been the ECJ. Relevant Community law would have
been applied, which would have ensured the uniform application
of EC law. At the least, the OSPAR arbitral tribunal was obliged
to take relevant EC law and ECJ jurisprudence fully into account
rather than adopting a divergent approach.
The application of the Solange-method in the IJzeren Rijn
dispute would have clearly made a huge difference in the outcome
of the case. By applying the Solange-method, the Jzeren Rijn
arbitral tribunal would have declined its jurisdiction in favor of the
ECJ. Since EC law was obviously applicable in this case, EC law
would have been the only appropriate solution. As a result, the
ECJ would have been called upon to adjudicate this dispute,
thereby ensuring the proper and uniform application of EC law
(especially the Habitats Directive) within the EC member states.299
This would have prevented the IJzeren Rijn arbitral tribunal from
formulating its inventive, but flawed line of argument to justify its
jurisdiction. It would have also sent a strong message to EC
member states that they should stop trying to circumvent the ECJ
when they think it is in their interest to do so. In this way, the
authority of the ECJ would have been strengthened instead of
weakened.
In the Mexico Soft Drinks case, the Solange-method could
have been applied by the WTO Panel and Appellate Body in order
to force the parties to find a solution within the NAFTA dispute
settlement body rather than litigate the dispute again before yet
another dispute settlement body.3" As mentioned above, the
Mexico Soft Drinks dispute is closely related to the much broader
and long-standing sugar dispute between the United States and
Mexico. The WTO Panel and Appellate Body already found
Mexico in breach of similar measures,"' so there was no need to relitigate the dispute before the WTO. This is particularly relevant to

299. Lavranos, The MOX Plant,supra note 1.
300. Final NAFTA Panel Decision, Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High
Fructose Corn Syrup, Originatingfrom the United States of America, MEX-USA-98-190401 (Apr. 15, 2002), available at http://registry.nafta-sec-alena.org/cmdocuments/2b2bOd9a570f-4f8c-bd47-a66bf4553ba2.pdf [hereinafter Corn Syrup Panel Decision].
301. Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Antidumping Investigation of High Fructose
Corn Syrup (HFCS), WT/DS132/AB/R, 1 136 (Nov. 21,2001).
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Mexico, which has been trying to establish a NAFTA panel (but
has thus far been blocked by the U.S.)."2 If the establishment of a
NAFTA panel could be induced by applying the Solange-method,
this would also strengthen the authority of the NAFTA dispute
settlement system.
The Brazilian Tyre case is particularly interesting because it
uses one dispute to illustrate the consequences of both the
application and non-application of the Solange-method. On the
one hand, the WTO panel applied the Solange-method by
acknowledging that Brazil adopted the disputed measure in order
to implement the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal's ruling.3 3
Moreover, the WTO Panel accepted the findings of the
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal as a fact of the case and did not
review Brazil's defense strategy before that tribunal. 4 In other
words, even though the WTO Panel exercised its jurisdiction in
this case, it respected the jurisdiction of the MERCOSUR arbitral
tribunal and took its award adequately into account by concluding
that Brazil did not violate its WTO obligations when implementing
the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal's decision. Thus, the WTO
Panel showed comity and delivered justice.
On the other hand, the WTO Appellate Body's approach
towards the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal's decision was quite
the opposite. Although the WTO Appellate Body avoided
reviewing the award of the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal, it did
discuss and reject Brazil's implementation of that award. The
WTO Appellate Body further criticized Brazil's defense strategy,
suggesting which provision Brazil ought to have relied upon before
the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal. Had the WTO Appellate Body
applied the Solange-method, it could have ensured a more
consistent resolution of the dispute and would have ensured that
the MERCOSUR and WTO law obligations remained congruent.
The ICJ's Genocide Convention judgment also illustrates how
the application of the Solange-method would have resulted in a
different and preferable outcome. Even though the ICTY never
challenged the ICJ's jurisdiction and competence regarding
general international law issues, the ICJ considered it necessary to

302. See Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO-NAFTA
'Spaghetti Bowl' is Cooking, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 197,198 (2006).
303. Lavranos, The MOX Plant, supra note 1, at 234.
304. Id.
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criticize the ICTY and limit its jurisdiction."' As a consequence, a
divergent jurisprudence exists regarding which test should be used
to determine whether or not the conditions for individual/state
responsibility for international crimes are met. This creates an
unnecessary fragmentation concerning a vital point of general
international law.
The ICJ could have avoided this situation if it had applied the
Solange-method. The ICJ could have easily adopted the approach
of the ICTY, thereby ensuring the uniformity of international law
and strengthening both its own authority and that of the ICTY.
Even more importantly, the ICJ could have ensured that the
horrific events in the Balkans would be treated (and punished)
equally.
To sum up, one can draw a number of conclusions from the
hypothetical application of the Solange-method in these cases.
First, had the Solange-method been applied by all courts and
tribunals, the length of the proceedings would have been
shortened, and there would have been a more consistent and
uniform application of law."
Second, the application of the Solange-method would have
increased the authority of the courts and tribunals. By acting in a
coordinated and efficient manner, the various dispute settlement
systems involved could have been strengthened. In other words,
the consistent application of the Solange-method would result in a
more rule-based dispute settlement culture between states.
Third, as a result of the previous points, the Solange-method
would have contributed to the rule of law. True justice would have
been delivered for the parties, the courts and tribunals, and the
legal orders involved. It can be safely concluded that a systematic
and consistent application of the Solange-method would
adequately allow courts and tribunals to resolve issues of
jurisdictional competition.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There is a need for regulating competing jurisdictions,
especially with the recent proliferation of international courts and

305. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, supra note 12, $ 403-406.
306. See Cesare P. R. Romano, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland,
101 AM. J. INT'L L. 171,178 (2007).
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tribunals and the lack of any formal legally binding institutional
coordination between those courts and tribunals."
As mentioned at the outset, competing jurisdictions are not
problematic. One may even sympathize with the view recently
posited by Professor Cogan, who argued that even more
jurisdictional competition is needed in order to constrain the
expanding power of international courts and tribunals."
The case studies discussed, however, illustrate the
fundamental problems that. have arisen from jurisdictional
competition." In the first place, inconsistencies in law create either
conflicting interpretations of the law or failures to take full
account of the law and jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals
that may be involved in a dispute. This results in a fragmenting
effect on the legal systems involved.
Second, several cases were clearly examples of forum
shopping, which resulted in endless re-litigation and protracted
proceedings. Such forum shopping contributes not only to huge
and unnecessary investments in resources (money, manpower, and
time), but also damages the political and economic relationships
between the parties involved. This is an important but often
underestimated cause for even more disputes between parties that
have been entangled in protracted proceedings.
Third, jurisdictional competition that leads to divergent
rulings or open ignorance of another court's existing jurisdiction
undermines the authority of courts and tribunals. This is
particularly true if the courts and tribunals openly criticize each
other, as has been the case between the ICJ and ICTY. One
should not underestimate the negative impression that this
behavior creates, not only upon government officials, but also
upon lawyers, academics, and the public at large.
Fourth, it should also be remembered that rulings by different
courts and tribunals create conflicting obligations for the parties
involved. This inevitably forces states to breach one law or the
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other, which in turn undermines the respect and belief in justice,
rule of law, and peaceful dispute resolution.
It can be concluded from the above analysis that the
application of the Solange-method would have helped to reduce or
even eliminate the problems associated with competing
jurisdictions. Indeed, a consistent and uniform application of the
Solange-method by all international courts and tribunals would
substantially reduce the risk of fragmentation of international legal
orders (including regional legal orders). It would also foster and
improve the understanding and informal cooperation between
international courts and judges. ' ,
The analysis has also shown that there is a firm legal basis
behind basic international law instruments that oblige all
international courts and tribunals to apply the Solange-method.
Moreover, comity, of which the Solange-method is one example, is
part of the legal duty of each and every court to deliver justice."'
Justice is part of the rule of law, a rule that is the most
fundamental principle underpinning the belief in international
cooperation and its advantages for individual.
But at the same time we should not forget that the application
of the Solange-method depends on the attitude of each judge."2
Accordingly, judges and arbitrators must begin recognizing both
the usefulness and the effectiveness of the Solange-method in
order to reap the benefits of international courts and tribunals
without jeopardizing justice and the rule of law.
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